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Summary
Delivering a speech at Kennington Jobcentre on 11 January 2019, the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions, Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP, set out her belief in the importance 
of the “welfare safety net”:
As a nation, I believe we all want a decent safety net: if you’re facing a 
difficult moment in life, the state should be there to help you. Whether 
that’s becoming unemployed, falling ill, or facing bereavement–nobody 
should find themselves alone in desperate circumstances. But it is vital 
that people are supported by this safety net, not trapped beneath it.1
Since 2010, Britain’s welfare system has undergone substantial reform. This has changed 
both the benefits available to claimants, and the levels at which those benefits are set. 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP/the Department) says that those changes 
are intended to encourage and incentivise work—rather than benefit receipt—and to 
alleviate and prevent poverty. But we have heard repeatedly in our recent inquiries 
that the Department’s reforms are pushing some people not only into poverty, but into 
hunger and destitution. The “welfare safety net” is not fit for purpose for people living 
on the breadline.
People rarely approach select committees when everything is going well. Even allowing 
for that, the contrast between the Department’s characterisation of the effect of recent 
reforms, and the evidence we have heard, is stark. It is difficult to avoid concluding 
that the Department simply does not understand the impact of its reforms on some of 
the most vulnerable people it supports. DWP’s policy decisions have a direct impact 
on the incomes of millions of people. There is no excuse for a lack of understanding or 
transparency about the effects of those decisions.
Measuring poverty and destitution
The Department’s announcement, in June 2016, that it will develop a new measure 
of poverty is encouraging. The Government’s existing measures of poverty focus on 
household income. It has no way of capturing whether that income is adequate for a 
household to live on. The new measure, based on work by the Social Metrics Commission 
(the Commission)—an independent, non-partisan commission—offers a more 
sophisticated understanding of who is “poor” and why. The Commission’s innovation is 
to view household finances like a profit and loss account, with income on one side and 
“inescapable costs” (such as childcare, housing or the costs of a health condition) on the 
other. We commend the Department for adopting the Commission’s measure. We are 
concerned, however, that it intends to use it alongside its existing measures, which will 
remain the “official” measures. To avoid accusations that it cherry picks which poverty 
data to use, we recommend the Department makes the new measure its official, central 
measure of poverty.
1 DWP, Speech by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at Kennington jobcentre about the future of 
Universal Credit, January 2019
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The Commission’s measure is of poverty, not destitution. These two terms are distinct. 
Some of the most worrying evidence we have received is from, and about, people who 
are “destitute”: chronically lacking basic resources such as food, stable housing or fuel 
because of a lack of money. The Department acknowledges that it would be helpful to 
understand these issues better, but the Government does not measure, or even define, 
“destitution” officially. The Commission’s approach shows that it is possible to take the 
debate away from arguments about terminology, towards a more constructive approach 
to tackling major, sustained hardship. The Department should replicate this approach, 
setting up an independent commission to develop a measure of destitution.
Risks of poverty
The Commission’s measure finds approximately the same number of people in poverty as 
the Government’s measure. But the composition of poverty—who is poor—is different. 
Under the Commission’s measure there are more disabled people and working-age 
families in poverty, but fewer pensioners, than the Government’s measure suggests.
Some people are more at risk of poverty than others. That is because they have “inescapable 
costs”. Disabled people often need to spend more than non-disabled people just to 
make society accessible and to have a similar standard of living. Parents—especially 
lone parents—who want to work frequently cannot avoid the costs of childcare. Those 
same groups may also find that their ability to increase their income through work is 
limited. This is where the safety net is needed most. The Department should do more 
to understand whether the benefits it offers to offset these costs are adequate. It has 
already said that it will review caps on childcare support. It should also commission an 
independent survey of the additional costs of disability, and use this when setting rates 
for disability benefits.
Governments’ successes in halving pensioner poverty since 2001 highlight just how 
important positive welfare policy can be in improving the living standards of people 
who cannot work, or are not expected to work. But unlike pensioners, working-age 
people have seen substantial reductions since 2010 in the value of some of the benefits 
that they may be entitled to.
The benefit freeze and uprating changes
‘Uprating’ is increasing the value of benefits to account for inflation. In 2011, the then-
Government changed the measure of inflation used in uprating, from the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI) to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). From 2013, most working-age benefits 
(including payments for people in work, for disabled people in the ESA-WRAG group, 
and for housing benefit claimants in the private sector via Local Housing Allowance 
[LHA]) were uprated by just 1%.
Even without any further changes, this would have contributed to a reduction in 
financial security for many of the households DWP supports. This includes people who 
need benefits to top-up income from low-paid work. But in 2015, the then-Chancellor 
announced that those same benefits would be frozen in cash terms for five years at 
2015/16 rates. The Government said this was necessary because benefit growth had 
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outstripped wage growth following the 2008 financial crisis: the freeze was framed as 
necessary to ensure “that it always pays to work”. The outcome is that already low rates 
of benefit have become divorced from the real costs of living.
By 2019, the Department had already saved £4.4 billion via the freeze: £0.9 billion more 
than it intended. It rejected our request to end the freeze early, however. Doing so would 
have lifted 200,000 people out of poverty; the Department’s regrettable decision means 
that very disadvantaged people are still losing out. When the freeze ends in 2020/21, a 
substantial chunk will have been taken out of the incomes of some of the country’s most 
vulnerable households.
Lifting the freezes as planned in 2020/21, therefore, is not enough. From 2020/21, the 
Government should increase the rates of frozen benefits by CPI plus 2%. That would 
mean that benefit rates would, after four years, reach the level at which they would have 
been set if they had not been frozen. From that point, the Department should commit 
to uprating benefits at least in line with inflation. In addition, the Department should 
produce a medium-term plan for linking the rate at which benefits are set with the real 
cost of living.
Understanding the impact of DWP policies
Universal Credit is the Department’s flagship reform: when it is fully rolled out, it will 
be claimed by seven million people. It represents a huge cultural and system change in 
itself. Its implementation alongside other reforms means that many thousands of people 
will be coping with multiple changes to the benefits they receive. DWP told us that it 
does not assess the cumulative impact of these changes, because such assessments do not 
usually take into account the effect of policy on behaviour. We think a full assessment 
is vital nonetheless: it is only by looking at changes in the round that the full impact of 
reform on household incomes can be understood. We recommend that the Department 
commissions and publishes a cumulative assessment of welfare reform since 2010 on 
claimant incomes.
The Social Metrics Commission’s approach to measuring poverty is underpinned by 
a conviction that “what gets measured gets done”. That also applies to the service that 
claimants receive from DWP. The Department is clear about what it expects from 
claimants, but vague about what claimants can expect from it in return. It lacks any 
kind of publicly available, measurable targets for its own performance. It claims this is 
because it wants to maintain flexibility in its service delivery. But that applies equally to 
other public services such as health and education, where standards are independently 
monitored and measured. DWP is not a special case.
The Department is concerned that people are being put off applying for Universal 
Credit by what it has called “scaremongering”. Unless it defines what is “acceptable” and 
measures whether that is being achieved, it cannot confidently claim to be delivering 
a consistently high-quality service, and in so doing refute the “scaremongering” 
allegations. It will also struggle to reassure sceptical claimants that they will be well-
supported, especially as they move to Universal Credit. The Department should work 
with its stakeholders and delivery partners (including Citizens Advice) to agree and 
implement clear, measurable, published performance measures. In the longer-term, 
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it should consider whether there is a case for introducing an independent regulator 
for working age benefits to ensure that specific service standards are met—mirroring 
arrangements in other parts of the welfare state, such as health and education.
The welfare safety net is about more than income, and more than DWP’s policies. But 
DWP has a vital role to play in maintaining its integrity, simply because its decisions 
affect the incomes of so many households and particularly the poorest. Successive 
Governments have made huge savings from almost a decade of changes to uprating 
policies and freezes. The outcome, however, is an increasingly patchy safety net, which 
is failing to support some of those who need it most. The Department has made an 
important first step in committing to measure poverty differently. It must now stand 
ready to act on what it will find.
7 Welfare safety net 
1 Introduction
1. Delivering a speech at Kennington Jobcentre Plus on 11 January 2019, the Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions, Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP (the Secretary of State), outlined 
“three fundamental principles” that she said should underpin the UK’s welfare system:
First: work–those who can, should; and those who cannot should be 
protected from poverty. Second–work should always pay. And third, the 
system should be fair. Fair for taxpayers who pay for it and fair to those 
who receive it, and fair to future generations–who do not deserve to become 
trapped in it.
As a nation, I believe we all want a decent safety net: if you’re facing a 
difficult moment in life, the state should be there to help you. Whether 
that’s becoming unemployed, falling ill, or facing bereavement–nobody 
should find themselves alone in desperate circumstances. But it is vital that 
people are supported by this safety net, not trapped beneath it.2
2. Since 2010 the UK’s welfare system has undergone substantial reform. We have 
already reported specifically on, or are in the process of inquiring into, several of these 
changes. They include:
• The roll-out of Universal Credit (UC). UC merges six separate benefits into one 
single, monthly household payment. It aims to simplify the welfare system and 
to improve incentives to work.3 When UC is fully rolled out (currently scheduled 
for 2023) it will be claimed by around 7 million households.4
• Changes to the conditions that people have to fulfil to receive benefits 
(“conditionality”), and the associated sanctions (loss of benefits) for failing to 
fulfil those conditions. The Welfare Reform Act 2012 and subsequent changes 
made sanctions “’longer, more severe and applicable to more people than ever 
before”.5 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP/The Department) has 
also experimented with conditionality for UC claimants who are working, 
conducting an in-work conditionality pilot.6
• The introduction of a “two child limit” in UC and Child Tax Credit. This limits 
the per child element of both benefits to the first two children in a household for 
new births from April 2017.7
2 DWP, Speech by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at Kennington Jobcentre about the future of 
Universal Credit, January 2019
3 Work and Pensions Committee reports including Universal Credit: the six week wait; Universal Credit: 
supporting self-employment ; Universal Credit and domestic abuse ; Universal Support ; Universal Credit: 
managed migration ; Universal Credit: support for disabled people ; Universal Credit: childcare, Universal Credit: 
tests for managed migration.
4 Kennedy, S., Keen, R., McInnes, R., Wilson, W., Mackley, R., Opposition Day Debate: Universal Credit, House of 
Commons Library debate pack CDP-2018–0221, October 2018, pp.1–2
5 Work and Pensions Committee, Benefit sanctions, Nineteenth report of Session 2017–19, HC 955, November 
2018, p.3
6 Work and Pensions Committee, In work progression in Universal Credit, Tenth report of Session 2017–19, HC 549, 
May 2016
7 Work and Pensions Committee, Two-child limit, Twenty-third report of Session 2017–19, HC 1540, January 2019, 
p.3
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• The introduction of a cap on the total amount households can receive in benefits: 
the “benefit cap”. The cap limits the amount some households can receive in 
benefits to £20,000 per year outside London and £23,000 in London.8
• The replacement of several centrally run welfare support schemes with local 
alternatives, administered by local authorities in England and by the devolved 
governments in Scotland and Wales.9
• The introduction of size criteria in the social rented sector (known as the 
“bedroom tax”).10
3. These policy changes have been accompanied by changes that have affected the value 
of individual benefits. Those include:
• Changes to benefit up-rating: the amount benefits are increased each year to 
account for inflation. In 2016 the Government introduced a five year freeze at 
2015/16 rates for most working-age benefits. It introduced a parallel freeze on 
Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rates, which determine the amount of housing 
benefit that people in the private rented sector can receive.11
• The Coalition Government announced in the June 2010 Emergency Budget that 
it would shift from using the Retail Price Index and “Rossi” Index to the (usually 
lower) Consumer Price Index for benefit up-rating.12 The Coalition also capped 
increases to most working-age benefits, child benefit and elements of tax credits 
to 1% from 2014/15. This was superseded by the freeze.13
• The introduction of a “triple lock” on state pensions in 2011, ensuring that 
benefit increases each year by whichever is the largest: 2.5%, the rate of inflation, 
or average earnings growth.14
• Changes to disability and incapacity benefits. These include the replacement of 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) with the Personal Independence Payment 
(PIP), and the decision to pay new claimants in the Employment and Support 
Allowance Work-Related Activity Group (ESA-WRAG) and its UC equivalent 
(the “Limited Capability for Work” [LCW] component) at the same rate as 
Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants from April 2016.15
Our work so far
4. Our predecessor Committee reported on the welfare safety net in 2016. That inquiry 
found that reductions to benefit levels and changes to entitlements and support, including 
some of those outlined above, had left people on the lowest incomes “more vulnerable 
8 Work and Pensions Committee, The benefit cap, p.5
9 Work and Pensions Committee, The local welfare safety net, Fifth report of Session 2015–16, HC 373, January 
2016, p.6
10 Work and Pensions Committee, Support for housing costs in the reformed welfare system, Fourth report of 
Session 2013–14, HC 720, April 2014
11 See Chapter 4
12 The Rossi Index is similar to RPI but excludes housing costs. For this reason, it more closely tracks changes in CPI 
than RPI does.
13 See Chapter 4.
14 See Chapter 3.
15 See Chapter 3.
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to financial crises”.16 The Committee recognised clear potential advantages in devolving 
responsibility for delivering support to local or regional governments. It found, however, 
that the expansion of local discretion combined with budgetary pressures had “given rise 
to concerns about the coverage and adequacy of the safety net, particularly in England, 
where variation in available help is widest”. The Committee also said that the Department 
lacked a “robust evaluation strategy for the welfare safety net as a whole”. It concluded:
Regardless of responsibility for delivery, central government maintains 
an ongoing obligation to ensure provision of a safety net which prevents 
vulnerable people from falling into severe hardship and destitution.17
5. Giving evidence to this inquiry, the former Minister for Family Support, Housing 
and Child Maintenance (the Minister), Justin Tomlinson MP, told us that there are 
“challenges” in the welfare system. He identified people not claiming benefits they are 
entitled to as a key issue.18 He also emphasised, however, that there is a “glass half full” 
interpretation of recent reforms:
We do have record employment; income inequality falling; incomes rising; 
the poorest fifth in society in real terms is better off since 2010; we have made 
changes, removing the tax credit 16, 24, 30-hour cliff edges and removed 
the artificial barriers to work; wages are rising; the rapid extension of the 
free-childcare offer; 1.8 million more children at “good” or “outstanding” 
schools, unlocking the next generation’s potential and so on.19
6. The Minister’s characterisation stood in stark contrast to the concerning evidence we 
have received, over multiple inquiries and from multiple organisations, of the impact of 
the Department’s reforms on people’s incomes, and on indicators of poverty, hardship and 
destitution (including foodbank usage and homelessness). Some examples from previous 
inquiries are set out in Box 1.20 Claimants, and the organisations that support them, have 
told us repeatedly that the Department is failing in its duty to prevent claimants falling 
into hardship.21 We also heard repeatedly that the Department lacks both the will and the 
means fully to understand and evaluate of the impact of its reforms on claimants.22 This 
may, to some extent, explain the disconnect between the Department’s view and those of 
many of our stakeholders.
Box 1: Evidence from previous inquiries
Benefit cap: Paula, a single mother of three children who was subject to the cap, 
told us: “You can’t afford to eat, you can’t afford to put your heating on, it’s a case of 
heating or eating basically […] My eldest lad used to leave food because he knew I 
ate the leftovers […] You don’t want to take food away from the children as you don’t 
16 Work and Pensions Committee, The local welfare safety net, p.3
17 Work and Pensions Committee, The local welfare safety net, p.4
18 Q188 (Justin Tomlinson)
19 Q187 (Justin Tomlinson)
20 See, for example, Universal Credit: the six week wait; Universal Credit: support for disabled people; Universal 
Credit: childcare costs; Benefit sanctions; Two-child limit; The benefit cap; The local welfare safety net.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. See also, for example, National Audit Office, Rolling out Universal Credit, HC 1123, Session 2017–2019, June 
2018, p.49; Equality and Rights Commission (WSN0111), Citizens Advice (WSN0114)
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know when you’ll next be able to [buy it], because you’re robbing Peter to pay Paul at 
this stage … Do you pay rent or do you pay your council tax? Do you buy food, or do 
you pay your electric?”
Benefit sanctions: Citizens Advice told us that their clients who had been sanctioned 
“more commonly borrowed money, cut back spending on food and other essentials, 
or fell into arrears with bills” than increasing their income through employment. 
Samantha, a single mother, described how the pressure of working full-time [and] 
struggling to meet the costs of childcare led to “serious stress and low moods as it 
seemed [she] was not able [to keep] up with it all”. She said that her “lack of childcare 
made it just impossible”, and she moved to a part-time job. She explained her 
circumstances to her Work Coach and provided confirmation from her doctor, but 
she was sanctioned for voluntarily leaving employment.
Samantha described the immediate impact on her income, which fell from an average 
of £800 per month to £300. She said that after “paying for food and a small amount 
of heating, I had quite literally no money.” She fell behind with rent and said she felt 
lucky to be given food parcels from friends, so she could “spend less on food and 
more on heating, or paying some of my rent arrears”.
Childcare costs: Upfront costs for childcare pose a challenge for parents who want 
to start work. Thuto Mali, a single parent with a young son from London, told us she 
had to turn down a job as “work did not pay”. She explained: “On a salary of £32,000, 
we would not be entitled to any Universal Credit, any housing benefit or any help. 
Having paid our rent, council tax and £1,500 per month for full-time childcare, plus 
the £500 deposit on top, we would be left with £60 for the entire month for all our 
bills. That is effectively £2 a day. Unfortunately, I was not able to take the job because 
it just did not work. Work did not pay for us. […] We were at the foodbank last 
Christmas because it got that bad. It is not that I do not want to work; it is just that 
work does not pay in this situation.”
Disabled people: We heard that changes to eligibility for disability premia—
additional benefit payments for some disabled adults without a paid-for carer—under 
UC are “likely to increase disabled parents’ need to rely on their children”. In turn, 
this could “negatively affect the life chances of children of disabled people”. The 
Children’s Society said:
“Ben has been a young carer for his mother, Andrea, for many years, carrying out 
a range of household tasks as well as helping his mother to get around… The only 
support/respite he gets is from attending his young carers group and some sport 
activities he is involved in. Andrea is very concerned about the abolition of the Severe 
Disability Premium, particularly about the impact this loss in financial support 
would have on her son’s quality of life. She worries that without this, Ben would not 
be able to go to his young carers group and the social activities they can only just 
afford to take him to. His life would just involve school and carrying out his care 
responsibilities.”
Survival sex: K, a single parent with a disabled child, told us: “I am about to be moved 
on to Universal Credit. I will lose £200 a month, approximately. […] I don’t have any 
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savings. I am scared that I will have to wait weeks before I get any money. I have just 
been trying to scrape together £1,500 to cover my mortgage and loans. I need to save 
some money so I am planning to escort or massaging or something similar. […] The 
thought of going into debt and having no money is really frightening. I have children. 
I can’t do that. I will sell my body.”
Source: <Committee reports and Q9 (K)>
7. We launched this inquiry to follow up our predecessor Committee’s report. We also 
wanted to take a wider look at the integrity of the UK’s welfare safety net, as changes 
announced since 2010 have continued to take effect. We received a large volume of evidence 
on the impact of reforms on different groups of people (including disabled people, lone 
parents, older people and children) and on the prevalence of different issues (such as hunger, 
homelessness and debt),23 and we visited a primary school, the Charles Dickens School 
in Southwark, to understand more about how families and teachers were managing the 
day to day impact of poverty and hardship. We also received evidence on more technical 
issues. Those included the way that poverty is measured—and, correspondingly, the extent 
to which DWP understands the impact that its policies have on claimants’ incomes and 
living standards.
8. People and organisations rarely approach select committees—or their MPs—
when everything is going well. Even allowing for that, the contrast between the 
Department’s characterisation of poverty and hardship since 2010, and the evidence 
we have heard repeatedly across multiple inquiries, from front-line organisations and 
claimants, is stark. It is difficult to avoid concluding that the Department lacks the 
tools and insight fully to understand and evaluate the impact of its reforms on some of 
the most vulnerable people it supports.
23 All of the written evidence received for this inquiry is published on the Committee’s website: https://www.
parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-pensions-committee/inquiries/
parliament-2017/inquiry12/
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2 Levels of poverty and destitution
9. The launch of this inquiry coincided with a visit to the UK in November 2018 by 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Professor 
Philip Alston, during which he met with members of this Committee.24 Following that 
visit, he gave his interim assessment of the overall impact of welfare reform, echoed in his 
full report in May 2019.25 Professor Alston said that “the changes to taxes and benefits 
since 2010 have been highly regressive, and the policies have taken the highest toll on those 
least able to bear it”.26 Citing data from the Social Metrics Commission—an independent 
commission, chaired by Baroness Philippa Stroud, aiming to develop a new approach to 
measuring poverty—he reported:
14 million people, a fifth of the population, live in poverty. Four million 
of these are more than 50% below the poverty line, and 1.5 million are 
destitute, unable to afford basic essentials. The widely respected Institute 
for Fiscal Studies predicts a 7% rise in child poverty between 2015 and 
2022, and various sources predict child poverty rates of as high as 40%. For 
almost one in every two children to be poor in twenty-first century Britain 
is not just a disgrace, but a social calamity and an economic disaster, all 
rolled into one.27
Drawing on evidence from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Professor Alston 
further commented that “the bottom 20% of earners will have lost on average 10% of their 
income by 2021/22 as a result of [changes since 2010]”. Women, families with children and 
households with a disabled person are particularly likely to be negatively affected.28 That 
analysis was reflected in evidence we received for this and previous inquiries.29
How does the Government measure poverty?
10. The Department does not fully agree with Professor Alston’s analysis. It initially 
cited its own data in response (see Box 2: How does the Government measure poverty?). 
Responding to an Urgent Question on the UN Report on 7 January 2019, the Minister 
said:
A lot was said [in the UN report] about measures of poverty and what 
the reality is out there. What we do know is that there are 1 million fewer 
people in absolute poverty—a record low—including 300,000 children. 
On the different measures of relative and absolute poverty before and after 
24 Work and Pensions Committee, Welfare safety net inquiry terms of reference, inquiry announced 15 November 
2018
25 Statement by United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Philip Alston on UK 
welfare reform, November 2018
26 Ibid, p.18
27 Ibid, p.1
28 Statement by United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Philip Alston on UK 
welfare reform, November 2018 , p.18
29 See, for example Work and Pensions Committee Universal Credit: support for disabled people; Universal Credit: 
childcare; Benefit sanctions. Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111), UK Women’s Budget Group 
(WSN0024), Disability Rights UK (WSN0083) , Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Inclusion London (WSN0053), Just Fair 
(WSN0042)
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housing, all are no higher than in 2010 and three are now lower. The average 
income of the poorest fifth in society under our Government has increased 
by £400 in real terms.30
The Minister acknowledged that people “on both sides of the debate will cherry pick 
the [figures and data] that work best for them”—a point also made by the Secretary of 
State.31 He also observed that MPs’ constituency case work demonstrates that headline 
figures “do not necessarily relate to real lives […] if you start talking about relative poverty 
measures and things like that it bears no resemblance to what is actually happening in 
[constituents’] lives”.
Box 2: How does the Government measure poverty?
There is currently no single measure of poverty in use in the UK. Various poverty 
measures based on household income are used by the Government, however. Two 
common measures are:32
• People in relative poverty—living in households with income below 60% of 
the median in that year; and
• People in absolute poverty—living in households with income below 60% of 
(inflation-adjusted) median income in some base year, usually 2010/11.
Income can be measured before or after housing costs (BHC or AHC). Poverty levels 
generally appear higher when income is measured after housing costs are deducted. 
This is because poorer households tend to spend a larger proportion of their income 
on housing.
In 2016/17, using the “poverty lines” above:33
• 10.4 million people—around one in six—were in relative poverty BHC. 14.3 
million—more than one in five—were in relative poverty AHC.
• 8.9 million people—around one in eight—are in absolute poverty BHC and 
12.4 million—almost one in five—AHC.
Official statistics on relative and absolute poverty are published by the Department 
in its annual Households below average income (HBAI) survey. HBAI data is derived 
from the Family resources survey: a weighted annual survey of over 19,000 UK 
households.34
The Government announced in May 2019 that it would develop new statistics alongside 
its existing poverty measures. These would draw on the approach of the Social Metrics 
Commission. This approach “looks at a family’s total available resources—including 
income and savings” after any inescapable costs, such as childcare or disability, are 
accounted for. The Department hopes to publish experimental statistics based on the 
30 HC Deb, 7 January 2019, vol. 652
31 Q185 (Justin Tomlinson)
32 Francis-Devine, B, Booth, B and McGuinness, F., Poverty in the UK: statistics, HC Library briefing paper 7096, July 
2019, p.3
33 Poverty in the UK: statistics, p.10
34 DWP, Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the UK income distribution:1994/5–2017/18, March 
2019, p.1
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measure in the second half of 2020. The Minister explained they will be published 
after the HBAI data, which “will continue to be the main measure of poverty in the 
UK”.35
11. In its written evidence to this inquiry, the Department cited data on material 
deprivation—whether households can afford certain essentials and activities—that 
suggested decreases in deprivation since 2010 amongst both children and pensioners.36 
The Minister told us that this data is “probably the closest to what it is like on the ground”.37 
The Department’s evidence said:38
• In 2010/11, 13% of children were estimated to be in families which had low 
income and were in material deprivation. In 2016/17, this had fallen to 11%. In 
both 2010/11 and 2016/17, 4% of children were estimated to be in families which 
had severe low income and were in material deprivation; and
• In 2009/10, 10% of pensioners aged 65 or over were estimated to be materially 
deprived. By 2016/17 this had fallen to 7%.
Background to the current approach
12. Under the Child Poverty Act 2010, the then Government adopted four measures and 
accompanying targets on child poverty. These included targets on relative and absolute 
poverty, on material deprivation, and on “persistent poverty” (the proportion of children 
that experience long periods of relative poverty). The child poverty targets were abolished 
through the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016.39 Announcing the change, Rt Hon Iain 
Duncan Smith MP, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions from 2010 to 2016, said that 
“how we measure things matters because it influences what Governments focus on and 
what we target”.40 He claimed that focusing on income—especially relative low income—
failed to acknowledge the root causes of poverty. He also set out a criticism that we heard 
repeated by witnesses during this inquiry: that focusing on an arbitrary “poverty line” 
(whether relative or absolute) can incentivise policy responses that try to lift those just 
below the threshold to just above it—without necessarily making a substantive difference 
to their lives.41 Mr Duncan Smith explained that for these reasons, the Department would 
continue to gather and publish data on poverty via the HBAI survey, but would no longer 
seek to meet targets on child poverty (or any other kind).42
13. Witnesses to our inquiry were somewhat critical of this approach. While generally 
agreeing that income is not the only determinant of someone is “in poverty” or their 
experiences as a result, we heard that household finances matter.43 But we heard a range 
of views on how a household’s financial resources could be better measured. For example:
35 DWP, Press release: New poverty statistics developed to help government target support, May 2019
36 DWP (WSN108)
37 Q185 (Justin Tomlinson)
38 DWP (WSN108)
39 Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 S1.7(1)
40 Iain Duncan Smith MP, Statement on Child Poverty, July 2015
41 Ibid. See also Q5 (Baroness Stroud)
42 Ibid
43 See, for example Q6 (Baroness Stroud) Q56–57 (Suzanne Fitzpatrick); Q123–131 (Sumi Rabindrakumar, Deborah 
Garvie and Peter Tutton)
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• Housing charity Shelter told us that any official measure of poverty must take 
housing costs into account.44 Deborah Garvie, Shelter’s Policy Manager, argued 
it is “absolutely vital” that the Department measures poverty after housing costs 
“in order to see how much housing costs are pushing people into poverty”.45 
Shelter also pointed out that, since HBAI is a household-based survey, it does 
not capture some groups who would usually be thought of as being “poor”: for 
example, people who are sleeping rough.46
• Disability charities Scope and Parkinson’s UK drew our attention to the 
additional costs associated with being disabled or having a long term health 
condition.47 Scope’s 2019 research found that, on average, disabled adults in the 
UK face additional costs of £583 per month. These additional costs can act to 
reduce household financial resources.48
• Save the Children told us that working, or taking on more hours, can boost 
a household’s income.49 But the cost of childcare can restrict those options. 
Save the Children’s research with the Centre for Social Justice noted that high 
childcare costs reduce parents’ earning potential, disposable income, and hence 
their ability to stay out of poverty.50
• StepChange, a debt support charity, told us that levels of household debt and 
unavoidable repayments reduce household income, can increase poverty levels, 
and make families more vulnerable to financial shocks. This means that even 
those not “in poverty” now may be vulnerable to falling into poverty in the 
future.51 The Department’s existing measures fail to capture the impact of debt 
on household income.52
The Social Metrics Commission
14. The work of the Social Metrics Commission (the Commission) draws together 
several of the concerns we heard. The Commission was established by Baroness Philippa 
Stroud, Iain Duncan Smith’s former adviser at DWP, in 2016 with the aim of finding a 
more accurate way of measuring poverty in the UK. The Commission’s final report on 
measuring poverty notes that coming up with a metric is only part of the challenge.53 Any 
44 Shelter (WSN0107). See also: The Equality Trust (WSN0039), University of York (WSN0117), CPAG (WSN0116), 
Zacchaeus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), Citizens Advice (WSN0114), London Plus (WSN0096), Ulster University 
(WSN0068), Shelter Scotland (WSN0045), Crisis (WSN0099)
45 Q119
46 Shelter (WSN0107). See also Social Metrics Commission: A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.25
47 Scope (WSN0054); Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106). See also: Mind (WSN0095), Leonard Cheshire (WSN0072), UK 
Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), Thomas Pocklington Trust (WSN0021), MND Association (WSN0055), CPAG 
(WSN0116), Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111) , MS Society (WSN0082)
48 Scope, Disability Price Tag policy report 2019, p.2
49 Save the Children (UCR0278).
50 Save the Children and Centre for Social Justice, A bright start, November 2018. See also: Centre for Social Justice 
(UCR0266), Save the Children (UCR0257), UK Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), CPAG (WSN0116), Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (WSN0111)
51 StepChange Debt Charity (WSN0059). See also Citizens Advice (WSN0114),
52 StepChange Debt Charity (WSN0059); Q111. See also Social Metrics Commission: A new measure of poverty for 
the UK report p.34
53 Social Metrics Commission: A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.9
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measure would also need to “gain widespread support” across the political spectrum and 
from the range of organisations interested in poverty measurement.54 The Commission 
describes the intended users of its measure as:
Charities representing specific individuals and groups, academics and 
researchers, the groups representing and working for people in poverty and 
civil servants across the UK’s administrations.55
Accordingly, the Commission describes itself as “rigorously non-partisan”, with members 
drawn from across the political spectrum and from various expert backgrounds.56
15. The Commission told us that a tendency to focus on “incomes only” (whether from 
work or benefits) means policy-makers have “failed adequately to consider the impact that 
a lack of financial resilience, and high essential costs have on families’ lives”. It argued 
that this has led to a “flawed understanding” of poverty levels amongst different groups 
of people.57 The Commission’s measure of poverty attempts to obtain a more accurate 
understanding of who is in poverty, and how deep or persistent that poverty is (see Box 3 
and Box 4). Its key innovation is to measure household resources “like a balance sheet”.58 Its 
measure considers the income coming into a household (and liquid assets that households 
can draw on immediately). It sets this against “inescapable costs”, such as those resulting 
from housing, childcare, or disability, to measure the disposable income a household has 
(see Box 3).
Box 3: What is the Social Metrics Commission’s poverty measure?
The Social Metrics Commission’s measure considers “poverty now”: the extent to 
which the material resources that someone has available to them now meet the 
needs that they currently have. The Commission’s measure of poverty aims to move 
“beyond the traditional focus on incomes”. This is because many families “both have 
access to non-income material resources” (such as liquid assets), and also “need to 
spend a portion of their resources on outgoings over which they have no short-term 
control” (inescapable costs).
Their measure works like a profit and loss account, setting resources against 
inescapable costs to come up with a measure of “total resources available”. This 
includes:
• Net income (earnings, benefits, and income from other sources, such as rent 
or interest);
• Other resources that can be freely accessed immediately.
And should take account of:
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 A full list of commission members is available at http://socialmetricscommission.org.uk/about/our-people/
57 Social Metrics Commission: A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.5
58 Q18
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• “Inescapable costs”. The requirement to pay these means that resources to 
meet day-to-day needs are reduced. The three costs that the Commission 
has included in its measure are housing, childcare, and the additional costs 
disabled people experience.
Source: Social Metrics Commission: A new measure of poverty for the UK
16. Using their measure, the Commission found that overall poverty levels in the UK 
have been largely unchanged since 2001. The composition of people in poverty has 
changed, however. When household incomes from work, benefits or other liquid assets 
are offset against “inescapable” costs there are fewer pensioners, but more working-age 
households with children and more disabled people “in poverty” than the Government’s 
existing official measures suggest (see Table 1).59
Table 1: Comparison of poverty levels: Social Metrics Commission and Government measures, 
2016/17
Source: Social Metrics Commission - A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.44
17. In May 2019, the Department announced that it would develop new poverty measures 
and statistics based on the Commission’s analysis. It intends to publish the first data in 
2020, and will assess “whether and how this [data] can be developed and improved further 
to increase the value of these statistics to the public”. The data will be published “after 
and alongside” the Department’s annual official HBAI publication.60 Announcing the 
59 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018
60 DWP, Press release: New poverty statistics developed to help government target support, May 2019
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Whilst the overall level of poverty is similar under the Commission’s measure, the composition 
of pov rty as changed significantly. Table 6 shows how the c mposition of poverty is split 
between people in different fami y types and families with different disability statuses. Overall, 
the Commission’s measure shifts the compo ition of poverty towards those in working-age families 
and those in disabled families. More in-depth analysis in the main report that accompanies this 
summary shows that the composition is also shifted towards those with childcare costs and 
those in overcrowded accommodation.
SMC Available Resources 
Poverty (55% threshold)
AHC relative low-
income poverty (60%)
People living in….
W
o
rk
in
g-
ag
e 
fa
m
il
ie
s
Single families, no children
89%
22%
86%
21%
Lone-parent families 18% 17%
Couple families, no children 10% 11%
Couple families with children 40% 37%
Pe
n
si
o
n
-a
ge
 
fa
m
il
ie
s Pension-age families, single
11%
5%
14%
7%
Pension-age couple family 6% 7%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Pr
es
en
ce
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f 
a 
di
sa
bl
ed
 p
er
so
n Those living in families where 
no-one is disabled
52% 56%
Those living in families where 
someone is disabled
48% 44%
100% 100%
 
Sources: Family Resources Survey and HBAI dataset (2016/17), SMC Analysis. 
Table 6: Composition of 
poverty, by family type 
and disability, 2016/17
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new measure, the new Minister for Family Support, Housing and Child Maintenance, 
Will Quince MP, said that the HBAI measures—relative and absolute low income—will 
continue to provide a “strong statistically robust picture of levels of poverty in the UK”. He 
explained that they will “continue to be the main measure of poverty in the UK”. He said, 
however, that the Commission makes a “compelling case” for looking at poverty more 
broadly to “give a more detailed picture of who is poor, their experience of poverty and 
their future chances of remaining in, or entering, poverty”.61 In the long run, the Minister 
said this approach could “help [the Department] to target support more effectively”.62
18. How poverty is measured matters: the measurement itself defines who is “poor” 
and therefore who might be helped. Financial resources are important, but the 
Government’s existing official measures focus on one side of the profit and loss account: 
household income. They make no allowance for the inescapable costs that different 
households face: from childcare, to housing, to debt repayments, to the costs of having 
a long-term health condition. All of these costs mean that households with the same 
incomes can find themselves in very different financial positions. Failing to consider 
inescapable costs—the other side of the account—results in a skewed understanding 
of who is “in poverty”, who is vulnerable to poverty, and how those households should 
best be helped and supported.
19. By including “inescapable costs” in its calculation, the Social Metrics Commission’s 
measure goes some way to addressing these weaknesses. We commend the Department 
for its decision to adopt and develop the Social Metrics Commission’s measure.
How should the new measure be used?
20. We heard that there would be value in the government adopting the Commission’s 
measurement as its new, central measure of poverty.63 Baroness Stroud summarised that 
“the lack of an agreed measure” both leaves the Government “unaccountable for their 
policy action on reducing poverty” and “prevents Government making a sustained 
effort on the issue of poverty”.64 Multiple witnesses told us that, without a single, central 
measure of poverty, it is very difficult to track trends in poverty over time.65 It is therefore 
also difficult for either Parliament or external stakeholders to hold government to account 
for the effect of its policy decisions on poverty levels.66 Baroness Stroud compared the 
extensive independent scrutiny of the Government’s fiscal policies with a relative lack of 
accountability for social policy decisions. She explained:
My observation was that when it came to the big economic decisions, what 
you had was clear measures that were held accountable, first of all by the 
Office for Budget Responsibility and then externally by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies.
61 DWP, Press release: New poverty statistics developed to help government target support, May 2019. See also 
Will Quince MP, New statistics will aid out understanding on supporting those on low incomes, PoliticsHome, 
May 2019
62 DWP, Press release: New poverty statistics developed to help government target support, May 2019
63 Q8–12 (Baroness Stroud and Matthew Oakley); Q109 (Deborah Garvie); Q111 (Sumi Rabindrakumar); Q111 (Peter 
Tutton); Q163 (Fran Bennett). See also: SHAL Housing (WSN0048), Just Fair (WSN0042),
64 Q3 (Baroness Stroud)
65 A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, p.9, Just Fair (WSN0042), Community Links (WSN0076), 
Q109 (Deborah Garvie)
66 A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, p.9
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When it came to social policy decisions and particularly the issue of poverty 
and the fact that there was no agreement over a poverty measure, there was 
no such direct accountability.67
21. Baroness Stroud explained that allowing Government to create its own poverty 
measures is “very difficult”. She told us that:
The temptation to make those metrics something that they can move and 
that they know they can move is so great. It is a little bit like being a poacher 
and gamekeeper all at the same time, it just does not work.68
Matthew Oakley, Head of Secretariat for the Commission, explained that the 
Commission’s central concern was creating a measure of poverty that would be acceptable 
across the political spectrum, in and outside Government. He told us that each of the 
Commissioners—drawn from different political and expert backgrounds—”probably 
came with their own views about how to measure poverty”. By “working through each 
of the arguments” and “working through each of the elements of poverty measurement”, 
they had been able to reach a point where “people with fairly different views on how you 
might tackle poverty are now agreeing wholeheartedly about how we measure it”.69
22. The Department intends for the Commission’s measure to sit alongside its existing 
poverty measures. The existing measures “will continue to be the main measure of poverty 
in the UK whilst [the new measure is] developed”.70 We heard support from a range of 
groups and organisations not involved in the Commission for the government adopting 
the Commission’s measure as its central measure of poverty—instead of the existing 
measures. For example:
• Professor Suzanne Fitzpatrick, lead researcher on the Destitution in the UK study, 
told us that it is “absolutely critical” that any measure of poverty can account for 
both income and inescapable costs.71 She explained that such a calculation also 
“lies at the heart of” the analysis of “destitution”, which results from an ongoing 
and substantial gap between income and essential costs.72
• Peter Tutton, Head of Policy at StepChange, said that the idea of a central 
measure that can account for differing costs was “a good one”. In addition to 
including inescapable costs, he explained that policy-making would benefit 
from a measure that captures the position of people just above a “poverty” line 
who, although they may not be included in poverty statistics, are nonetheless 
very vulnerable to financial shocks (see Box 4).73
• The Trussell Trust said that the Commission’s approach was “robust”, particularly 
as it takes into account the additional costs of disability and childcare.74
67 Q4
68 Q5
69 Q10
70 DWP, Press release: New poverty statistics developed to help government target support, May 2019
71 Q57. See also: The Trussell Trust (WSN0105), Community Links (WSN0076), SHAL Housing (WSN0048)
72 Q57 (Suzanne Fitzpatrick)
73 Q111–112 (Peter Tutton)
74 Q111, The Trussell Trust (WSN0105)
 Welfare safety net 20
• Shelter praised the inclusion of housing costs in the Commission’s measure. 
They also commended the measure because it includes people who are sleeping 
rough, who are not captured in HBAI poverty data.75
• Professor Alston urged the Government to “adopt [the Commission’s approach]”, 
noting it had received an “impressive degree of cross-party support”. His report 
criticised the Government’s existing suite of measures from the HBAI survey 
on the basis that these allow government “to pick and choose which numbers to 
use”.76
Box 4: The Social Metrics Commission’s wider measurement framework
The Social Metrics Commission’s “single measure” fits within a wider measurement 
framework. In addition to measuring the incidence of poverty, Commissioners 
identified a “large range of factors they wanted to be able to measure as they affect the 
experience of poverty, influence the future likelihood of poverty, or are consequences 
that flow from being in poverty”.
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Data to use
The Commission wanted their measure to be based on actual information on individuals, 
families and households in the UK, which is updated regularly and comprehensive enough to allow 
a wide-ranging assessment of all the factors outlined above. Currently, the most comprehensive 
source of this information is the Family Resources Survey (for poverty and poverty depth)9 and the 
Understanding Society study (for poverty persistence).10 A combination of these data sources will 
be used to report on Lived Experience Indicators.
However, the Commission also highlighted the need to improve both UK household survey 
data and how this is/or could be linked with administrative data. Doing so would improve our 
understanding of poverty.
Figure 1: The 
Commission’s core 
measurement framework
Understanding who is in poverty Understanding more about the nature of that poverty
POVERTY Persistence 
of poverty
Depth 
of poverty
Lived 
Experience 
Indicators
Alongside its central measure of poverty (Box 2), the Commission therefore also 
reports on three other areas:
• Depth of poverty. This avoids creating an “arbitrary measur  of deep poverty” 
(such a  an income threshold), and instead measures ow far abov  or below 
t e poverty li e families are. It enables policy-makers to understand the scale 
of the challenge families face in moving out of poverty, and how close others 
are to falling into poverty.
• Persistence of poverty: This assesses how long families in poverty have been 
in poverty for. This should allow the cumulative impact of poverty over time 
to be measured and tackled.
75 Q119. See also: The Equality Trust (WSN0039), University of York (WSN0117), CPAG (WSN0116), Zacchaeus 2000 
Trust (WSN0115), Citizens Advice (WSN0114), London Plus (WSN0096), Ulster University (WSN0068), Shelter 
Scotland (WSN0045), Crisis (WSN0099)
76 Statement by United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Philip Alston on UK 
welfare reform, November 2018 , p. 16
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• “Lived experience” of poverty: This assesses factors and characteristics that 
affect a family’s experience of poverty, make it more likely that they will 
become trapped in poverty, or are likely predictors of their experience of 
poverty. “Lived experience” factors include health, education levels, whether 
someone is in or out of work, and their family lives and relationships.
Source: Social Metrics Commission, p.14
23. Prior to the Department’s announcement that it would develop the Commission’s 
measure, we put it to the Secretary of State and former Minister that introducing a single 
measure that has wide political support could allow more effective independent scrutiny 
of Government policies on poverty, enable greater accountability and could result in 
better, more sensitive policy-making. It could also help bolster DWP’s case for spending 
allocations from the Treasury. The Secretary of State told us that such a measure would 
be “useful” to the Department, “in addition to the [existing measures]”.77 The then-
Minister, Justin Tomlinson, told us that the data could be useful in providing “evidence 
to demonstrate why it should be us, not perhaps other Departments, who benefit from 
that additional money”. It might also allow the Department “to identify where we can go 
across Government to bid for funding”.78
24. Clear metrics ensure that Government is held accountable for its spending 
decisions. Yet the multiple different measures of poverty in use within and outside 
Government mean there is no such direct and effective accountability for social policy 
choices. Without a clear, agreed and central measure it is difficult to track trends in 
poverty over time, and still more so to understand how government policy helps or 
hinders poverty rates.
25. The Department has agreed to develop and publish experimental data based on 
the Social Metrics Commission’s measure, from mid-2020. But it intends to do so 
alongside its existing poverty data—and for those data to remain the “official” measure 
of poverty. The Commission’s measure offers the prospect of an improved, nuanced 
understanding of who is in poverty, and how they can best be helped. Adopting it 
as a central measure would also protect the Department against claims that it picks 
and chooses which poverty data to use in response to different issues. We recommend 
that Government adopts the Social Metrics Commission’s metric as its official, central 
measure of poverty. It should continue to collect its existing poverty data alongside 
this, to maintain a long-term dataset. We also recommend the Department provides us 
with an update on the progress of its work developing the Social Metrics Commission’s 
measure by the end of 2019.
Other measures
26. There are various other measures of poverty and hardship in use in the UK. These 
are compiled by multiple different sources, including Government. Some of these consider 
factors instead of, or in addition to, household income and make specific reference to their 
relationship with income poverty. They include:
77 Q124–126 (oral evidence: Benefit freeze)
78 Q272 (oral evidence: Welfare safety net)
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a) “Destitution”: measured, for example, in the annual Destitution in the UK report 
and survey.79 The 2019 report notes that destitution typically occurs “against 
a backdrop of sustained poverty and long-term hardship”. Households are 
“pushed from severe poverty […] by some combination of debt, benefit and 
health problems”. The survey defines someone as ‘destitute’ if they lacked at least 
two of six ‘essentials’ over the past month because of a lack of money.80
b) Material deprivation, such as a lack of food, fuel or housing. DWP announced 
in February 2019 that it would seek to measure “hunger and food insecurity”—
the extent to which households skip meals or are unable to afford food—via the 
Family resources survey.81 It expects to report its first data in 2021.
c) Measures of homelessness and rough sleeping are published by the Department 
for Housing, Communities and Local Government.82 Crisis, the homelessness 
charity, also produces an annual Homelessness monitor survey.83
d) Living standards, and the income needed for an “acceptable” standard of 
living. Research on the “minimum income standard” (MIS) produces budgets 
for different household types, based on what members of the public think is 
necessary for a minimum acceptable standard of living in the UK.84 MIS research 
is used for various purposes: for example, to calculate the “real Living Wage”,85 
and as part of the Scottish Government’s measure of fuel poverty.86
e) Life chances: The Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 amended the measures 
in the Child Poverty Act 2010, replacing them with a set of indicators based 
on household employment/unemployment, educational attainment, and family 
stability.87
27. We questioned whether the SMC’s measure could be used to measure other types of 
hardship, such as destitution, or could be extended to include other metrics.88 Matthew 
Oakley told us that the Commission viewed concepts such as destitution and life chances 
as vitally important, but distinct from “poverty”.89 The Commission felt that “to pretend 
they are the same thing is not the way forward”, and Commissioners “did not want to 
conflate measuring poverty with measuring living standards, life chances or destitution”.90 
79 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Destitution in the UK 2018, June 2018
80 The six essentials used in the survey are: shelter/housing (sleeping rough for two or more nights), food (fewer 
than two meals a day for at least two days), heating and lighting (unable to heat or light their home for five or 
more days), having appropriate clothing and footwear, and having basic toiletries.
81 The Guardian, UK hunger survey to measure food insecurity, February 2019
82 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Homelessness statistics, Last updated May 2019
83 Fitzpatrick, S., Pawson, H., Bramley, G., Wood, J., Watts, B., Stephens, M. and Blenkinsopp, J, The Homelessness 
monitor: England 2019, May 2019
84 See Centre for Research in Social Policy, Loughborough University, Minimum Income Standard for the United 
Kingdom, accessed July 2019
85 The National Living Wage is the statutory minimum wage which is paid to those over the age of 25. The NLW is 
currently set at 55% of median earnings (£8.21- 2019/20) and is targeted to reach 60% of median earnings by 
2020. The “real” Living Wage is calculated independently and is based on the cost of living according to a basket 
of goods. The RLW for 2018/19 as calculated by the Living Wage Foundation was £9 for the UK and £10.55 in 
London. More information can be found here: https://www.livingwage.org.uk/what-real-living-wage
86 Scottish Government, Draft Fuel Poverty Strategy for Scotland 2018, June 2018
87 Ulster University (WSN0068); Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016
88 Q11 (Matthew Oakley); Social Metrics Commission (WSN0084)
89 Q11 (Matthew Oakley)
90 Q11 (Matthew Oakley)
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It chose instead to focus on finding agreement over measuring poverty itself. Matthew 
Oakley acknowledged, however, that “there are things within the measure from which 
you can probably make inferences about destitution”—such as the Commission’s measure 
of the depth of poverty.91 The Department acknowledged that “looking at the lower end 
is […] very important”, including whether people have access to “shelter, food, heating, 
lighting and so on”—all commonly included in measures of “destitution”.92 Several 
witnesses agreed that an official measure of destitution—as a severe and chronic form of 
poverty and deprivation—would be similarly helpful in policy terms as a single measure 
of poverty.93
28. The Government measures poverty in multiple different ways: its transparency 
and accountability would benefit substantially from adopting a central measure. 
Other stakeholders gather and publish data on wider, connected issues, including 
destitution, hunger, homelessness, life chances and living standards. Some of the 
most striking and concerning evidence we have received is from and about people 
who are “destitute”. But the Government does not currently measure, or even define, 
“destitution” officially. The Commission’s approach shows that it is possible to take 
the debate away from arguments about terminology, towards a more constructive 
approach to tackling major, sustained hardship.
29. We recommend that the Department develop a measure of “destitution”. This 
should build on the Social Metrics Commission’s approach, establishing an independent 
commission to come up with a common, widely-accepted understanding of destitution 
and how it can be measured.
Next steps: debt and deductions
30. The Commission explained that within its measure, the choice of metrics was 
constrained by the availability of “robust data”.94 Crucially, this data needed to be suitable 
for cross-referencing with other data used in the measure. In practice, this meant in most 
cases that the data for the central measure needed to be taken from the Family resources 
survey.95 Data on net income, liquid assets, housing costs and childcare are included in 
the survey. As such, the Commission was able to include these costs in its measure.96 The 
Commission was also able to provide a usable proxy for the additional costs disabled 
people experience.97
31. The Commission told us there were some metrics they would have liked to include 
in their measure but were unable to. In particular, Commissioners believed that debt 
repayments should be considered an “inescapable cost”.98 We heard agreement on this 
point from several other witnesses, and have reached a similar conclusion in previous 
inquiries.99 Our recent report on Universal Support, for example, found that unmanageable 
91 Q11 (Matthew Oakley)
92 Q185
93 Q11 (Matthew Oakley); Q113 (Peter Tutton); Q114 (Sumi Rabindrakumar); Q119 (Deborah Garvie). See also: 
Church of England and the Children’s Society (WSN0046), Shelter Scotland (WSN0045), The Equality Trust 
(WSN0039), The Trussell Trust (WSN0105), NHS Health Scotland (WSN0074)
94 A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, pp.16–17
95 Social Metrics Commission (WSN0084), A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, pp.16–17
96 Q23–25, A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, pp.16–17
97 We return to this in Chapter 3.
98 A new measure of poverty for the UK, September 2018, p.16.
99 See Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Support.
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debt repayments (including to DWP) can force households into a “downward spiral of 
debt and hardship”.100 We have also previously highlighted the limitations of DWP data 
collection on debt levels, including on sources of debt and on deductions.101 This lack of 
robust, accessible data on debt has meant that it was not possible for the Commission to 
include debt repayments in its “inescapable costs”.102
32. The Social Metrics Commission believes debt repayments should be included in 
the “inescapable costs” that affect household income. We agree. Debt repayments—
including of debts to Government—can push people into a spiral of poverty, 
hardship, hunger and destitution from which it is difficult to escape. Without a good 
understanding of household debt, the prospect of well-targeted policies that help 
households alleviate and manage that debt is remote. But the data DWP collects on 
claimant debt is piecemeal, and not suitable for use with the Commission’s measure. 
We recommend the Department introduce questions on household debt to the Family 
Resources Survey for 2020/21, so that it can include debt repayments in its calculation 
of the inescapable costs that households face.
33. Around 60% of recipients of UC see deductions made from their payments.103 These 
may be for repayment of Advances, overpayments, or other debts, including to Government 
and other public sector bodies. These deductions can be up to 40% of the UC standard 
allowance.104 Derbyshire County Council told us that these deductions can mean that 
claimants are, in some cases, left with as little as £20 per week to cover their bills, food and 
other essential costs.105 The Department has proposed to reduce the maximum deduction 
to 30% of the standard allowance from October 2019, and for Advances to be repaid over 
16 months from October 2021.106 StepChange, a debt support charity, modelled the effect 
of different levels of deductions on benefit claimants who are in debt. They explained 
that even a 5% deduction would leave almost half of their clients unable to meet essential 
expenditure.107 The National Association of Welfare Rights Advisers (NAWRA) told our 
Universal Support inquiry that, all too often, DWP decision makers set deductions at 
the maximum rate possible, without giving due consideration to claimants’ individual 
circumstances.108
Box 5: Our previous recommendations on deductions
Our report on Universal Support recommended that the Department gather and 
publish data on deductions for debt from Universal Credit awards. This should include 
data on deductions as a proportion of the overall award. It should use this, alongside 
commissioning advice from debt experts, to review its maximum deduction caps 
and ensure they are set at levels that would be sustainable for most claimants. We 
concluded that this would help to ensure that the design of Universal Credit does not 
prevent it from achieving its objectives.
100 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Support, p.3
101 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Support, pp. 19–24
102 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.16 and p.18
103 NAO, Rolling out Universal Credit, p.32
104 NAO, Rolling out Universal Credit, p.42
105 Derbyshire County Council (WSN0119)
106 HM Treasury, Budget 2018, Table 1.8 and HC Deb, 28 June 2019, cW
107 StepChange (UCR0261)
108 National Association of Welfare Rights Advisers (UCR0262)
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We found that the Government’s approach to debt collection currently lags behind 
best practice in the retail debt sector. We recommended that the Department 
introduce a flexible, discretionary approach to debt deductions that learns from the 
best examples in the retail sector. This should include:
a) Improved communication with claimants about what deductions are being 
made, for what purpose, and for how long. This should be issued before the 
deductions start, giving claimants time to prepare and understand their 
budget;
b) Changing guidance to DWP decision makers, setting out clearly how they 
should go about assessing affordability of debt repayments;
c) Clear guidance on the circumstances in which deductions should not be 
applied owing to a risk of harm to the claimant, and on assessing requests for 
reduced deductions and payment breaks.
Source: <Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Support>
34. The Department’s decision to reduce the maximum deduction cap in Universal 
Credit from 40% to 30% is a small step in the right direction. But if the Department 
continues to set deductions at the highest possible rate—without due consideration for 
claimants’ circumstances—it will continue to drive claimants into severe hardship. We 
have previously recommended that the Department introduce a flexible, discretionary 
approach to debt collection that takes affordability of repayments as its starting point, 
and that it takes steps to better understand the impact of deductions on claimant 
incomes and debt. We reiterate both of these recommendations, and further recommend 
the Department assess the impact of reducing the maximum deduction cap to 20%.
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3 Drivers of poverty amongst different 
groups
35. The Social Metric Commission’s measure of poverty accounts for both some of the 
“inescapable costs” of living (including those relating to childcare, disability and housing), 
and the resources that households have available to meet those costs. Through measuring 
poverty in this way, the Commission’s measure takes account of both the way in which 
inescapable costs affect people’s ability to make ends meet, and the way that people can 
use liquid assets to “meet their current needs”.109
36. Under the Commission’s measure 14.2 million people in the UK are in poverty. 
This compares with 14.3 million in relative poverty, measured after housing costs, 
using the Government’s relative low income measure.110 Despite the number of people 
in poverty being similar across both the Government and the Commission’s measures, 
the composition of people in poverty differs. The Commission, and other witnesses, told 
us this is largely to do with the inescapable costs of living (for example, as a result of 
disability, housing or childcare costs); the ability of households to increase their income to 
meet those costs (for example. through work), and the adequacy of Government support 
for households that cannot meet their costs.111
Older people
Box 6: The triple lock
There is a statutory requirement for the Government to uprate both the new State 
Pension (introduced in 2016) and the “basic” tier of the previous state pension 
annually, at least in line with earnings.
The triple lock is a commitment over and above this requirement, to uprate by 
whichever is the highest: earnings, prices, or 2.5%. It was announced in 2010 by the 
Coalition government, and has been in place since April 2011.
Source: <House of Commons Library>
37. The Commission’s measure suggests that poverty rates amongst pension-age adults 
fell from 20.8% in 2001 to 11.4% in 2017.112 The Commission attributes this to “all the 
hard work done to improve the lives of pensioners” over the last two decades, and to 
“concerted policy action” by Government.113 Our predecessor Committee reported in 
2016 that the decision by the then-Government to protect older people from “spending 
cuts that have been largely been felt by younger groups” has played a significant part in 
this reduction.114 This includes the “triple lock” on state pensions (see Box x) and the 
109 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.7
110 The Social Metrics Commission uses the Government’s relative poverty AHC measure as a comparator in its 
report. See Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.97 and Poverty in the 
UK: statistics, p.10
111 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.43; QQ.18–20 (Baroness Stroud); 
Q111 (Sumi Rabindrakumar); Q160 (Sally West)
112 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.123
113 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.4
114 Work and Pensions Committee, Intergenerational fairness, Third report of Session 2016–17, HC59, November 
2016, p.3
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exemption of pensioner benefits from the benefit freeze.115 Older people have also retained 
universal (ie. non-means tested) access to a range of additional benefits that can reduce 
their costs of living, including free TV licenses (up until 2020), bus passes and the Winter 
Fuel Payment. Pensioners are also exempt from paying National Insurance if they decide 
to work.116
38. The Commission’s estimate of 11% of pensioner households in poverty compares 
favourably with the Government’s own measure, which places pensioner poverty at 
14%.117 Baroness Stroud, the Commission’s Chair, told us that the “key reason” for this 
discrepancy is the inclusion of liquid assets (assets that are readily converted into cash) in 
their metric. She explained that pensioner households often have low incomes, but tend 
more than other types of household to supplement income by drawing down on assets. If 
these assets are not included in the balance sheet, then pensioner poverty appears to be 
higher.118
39. The Commission acknowledged that the decision to include liquid assets in their 
calculations had an impact on perceived levels of pensioner poverty. Baroness Stroud 
told us that there were “huge debates” over how to consider liquid assets in poverty 
measurement in general.119 Matthew Oakley said that a decision had been made to try to 
capture “poverty right now”, rather than trends that may arise in the future. He explained 
that the Commission recognised that “for pensioners in particular, there is a longer-term 
consideration that needs to be taken into account”.120 He said, however:
Right now today if a pensioner household has £2,000 and a cash ISA they 
can spend that £2,000 and the cash ISA more so than a similar pensioner 
household that does not have that £2,000 and a cash ISA. That is what the 
measure is looking at—poverty today. As I said, we need obviously as a 
country to measure other things like pension adequacy and wider measures 
of financial resilience. That should go alongside our measure.121
40. Age UK, a charity supporting older people, agreed that the number of pensioners 
living in poverty has fallen substantially over the last twenty years.122 They cautioned, 
however, that since 2010/11 the numbers have remained “more or less the same until 
2015/16 when, worryingly, numbers rose”.123 This is reflected in the Commission’s 
measure.124 Age UK also reported concerns over the financial resilience of older people in 
the shorter term. They said that a key driver of poverty amongst this group is “the impact 
of an unexpected expense”: they cited, for example, the case of a women in her mid-80s 
who they had supported who needed a new boiler. She was struggling on a “small private 
pension”—which meant her income was too high to claim benefits. She had no savings, 
115 See also House of Lords Select Committee on Intergenerational Fairness and Provision, Tackling 
intergenerational unfairness, Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 329, March 2019
116 Thurley, D., Kennedy, S. and Keen, R. Pensioner benefits, House of Commons Library briefing SN06354, June 
2017
117 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.134
118 Q26 (Baroness Stroud)
119 Q28
120 Q.27–29 (Matthew Oakley)
121 Q29 (Matthew Oakley)
122 Age UK, Poverty in later life, April 2018; Q164 (Sally West)
123 Age UK, Poverty in later life, April 2018, p.3
124 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.123
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and family members could not meet the cost of a new boiler.125 We and our predecessor 
Committee have also heard large amounts of evidence on the long-term adequacy of 
pensions and retirement savings.126
41. Pensioner poverty has fallen in the last two decades. That is thanks, in part, to 
successive governments agreeing the scale and nature of the problem, and taking 
concerted action to fix it. But the Government cannot afford to be complacent. Set 
against this success are concerns over older peoples’ financial resilience, and questions 
about whether policies that have delivered real improvements in poverty rates are 
sustainable. We intend to return to these issues in our future work.
Disabled people
Box 7: Estimating the costs of disability
Witnesses to multiple inquiries have told us that disabled people face “inescapable 
costs” that increase their cost of living.127 These might include the costs of extra 
support and help with daily living, meeting mobility needs, or increased costs for 
basic essentials like fuel, food or housing.
The Commission’s measure uses the value of benefits intended to help cover the 
additional costs of disability as a proxy for those costs (PIP, DLA and Attendance 
Allowance). The value of these benefits is subtracted from the income of households 
where a disabled person lives (irrespective of whether they are claiming the benefits), 
as a reflection of the “inescapable costs” of disability and its impact on a households’ 
disposable income.
Source: < Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.17>
42. Since 2010, several changes to the welfare system have affected the benefits that are 
available to disabled people. They include:
a) The replacement of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) with the Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP) in 2013, for people aged 16–64. As of early 2019, 
the Department had processed 4.2 million PIP claims (1.5m reassessments from 
DLA to PIP and 2.6 million new claims). 43% of new claimants, and 72% of 
former DLA claimants have been awarded PIP, often after appeal.128
b) The decision to pay the ESA “Work-related activity group” (WRAG) component 
and its UC equivalent (the Limited Capability for Work/LCW component) at 
the same rate as Jobseeker’s Allowance from April 2016 (currently £73.10 per 
125 Age UK, Poverty in later life, April 2018, p.7
126 See, for example, Work and Pensions Committee, Intergenerational fairness; Work and Pensions Committee, 
Automatic enrolment, Eleventh report of Session 2015–16, HC579, May 2016; Work and Pensions Committee, 
Self-employment and the gig economy, Thirteenth report of Session 2016–17, HC 847, May 2017
127 Q18 (Baroness Stroud); Q111 (Sumi Rabindrakumar) ; Q158–160 (Michael Griffin) ; Q158–160 (Sally West); Q163 
(Fran Bennett, Elliot Kent). See also Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: support for disabled 
people; Work and Pensions Committee, PIP and ESA Assessments, Seventh Report of Session 2017–19, HC829, 
February 2018; Work and Pensions Committee, Disability employment gap, Seventh report of Session 2016–17, 
HC56, February 2017; Scope (WSN0054); Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Mind (WSN0095), Leonard Cheshire 
(WSN0072), UK Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), Thomas Pocklington Trust (WSN0021), MND Association 
(WSN0055), CPAG (WSN0116), Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111) , MS Society (WSN0082)
128 DWP, Personal Independence Payments: official statistics to April 2019, June 2019
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week).129 The WRAG is intended for people who are not currently well enough 
to work, but who are expected to take steps to prepare to return to work. This 
was a reduction of £29.05 per week on the previous rate.130 Both the WRAG and 
LCW rates have been frozen since 2016/17 (see next chapter).
c) Changes to the various top-ups available to disabled people on, or moving to, UC. 
For example, the Severe Disability Premium (SDP—worth up to £64.30 per week 
for single people, or £128.60 for couples) and the Enhanced Disability Premium 
(EDP: £16.40 per week/£23.55 per week) are not available to new claimants, or 
those who migrate “naturally” to UC due to a change in their circumstances.131
d) Changes to the benefits available to households where there is a disabled child. 
Under the legacy system, parents with a disabled child receiving DLA could 
receive an additional £273 per month via Child Tax Credit. Parents whose 
children receive higher-rate DLA or PIP could also receive a further £110 per 
month. Under UC, only children with either a severe visual impairment, or 
who receive the higher-rate of DLA or the enhanced rate of PIP’s daily living 
component, will be able to receive the higher rate “disability addition” in UC. 
Families with a child on the lower rates of either benefit will receive substantially 
less. Their entitlement is halved to £126 per week for new claimants and those 
migrating “naturally”.132
43. The Department has argued that changes to disability benefits will allow it to better 
target support. Defending the removal of the SDP and EDP from UC for new claimants, 
the Department explained that it intended to “recycle the savings” back into support.133 
Specifically, it would enable people in the Support Group equivalent in UC to claim an 
additional amount “that is substantially higher than the current Support component 
in ESA”.134 It said that this would offer additional help to “the most severely disabled” 
people.135 The UC “limited capability for work related activity” (LCWRA) component—
the equivalent of the ESA Support Group component—is more generous than the benefit 
it replaces. It will be increased in value by around £38 per week, to be worth £76 in 2018.136 
Similarly, households with children who remain eligible for the higher rate disability 
addition under UC will receive slightly more than they would have under the legacy 
system. But DWP’s own research shows that at least 100,000 households with a disabled 
child will receive less support under UC.137
129 Work and Pensions Committee, Disability employment gap, p.22
130 House of Commons Library, Abolition of the ESA Work-Related Activity Component, p.3
131 Claimants already receiving the premia should now receive transitional protection payments (including 
backdated payments, if necessary) if they move to Universal Credit without a change of circumstances (via 
“managed migration”). As of July 2019, however, the Government had not yet brought forward regulations to 
allow these payments to be made. For more detail see Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: support 
for disabled people.
132 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: support for disabled people.p.22
133 DWP, Welfare reform bill: Universal Credit, Equality impact assessment, November 2011, p.9
134 The Support Group is intended for claimants who are too unwell to work, or to undertake steps to prepare for 
work (ie. “work related activity”). Claimants in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) are those assessed as 
too unwell to work now, but who are expected to take steps to prepare for work in the future.
135 DWP, Welfare reform bill: Universal Credit, Equality impact assessment, November 2011, p.9
136 Gov.uk, Universal Credit: what you’ll get, December 2018
137 Cited in Contact a Family, Universal Credit and cuts to the disabled child element (research briefing), April 2016
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44. Under the Commission’s measure, nearly half of people in poverty (48.3%)—6.9 
million—are living in families with a disabled person.138 This compares to 44% under 
the Department’s relative low-income measure, after housing costs.139 Of those classified 
as being in poverty under the Commission’s measure, but not under the Government’s 
current measure, 67.1% are living in households where at least one person is disabled.140 
The Commission says that this is in part related to the way that their metric measures 
household income. Disabled people often have higher living costs than non-disabled 
people. This reduces their disposable income. Reflecting this, the Commission’s analysis 
shows that disabled people are amongst the most likely to be in “persistent poverty” (being 
below the poverty line for at least two of the last three years).141
45. Several witnesses told us that the recognition of the extra costs of disability in the 
Commission’s measure is, therefore, useful. Sally West, Policy Manager at Age UK, told us 
that the Commission’s decision to make a reduction based on the “extra” income provided 
by disability benefits was “perfectly reasonable”. She said that if the Department is giving 
additional financial support to disabled people to cope with the extra cost of living with a 
disability, “you need to take [away] the extra costs or ignore the income”. She explained, 
however, that even this will not “give the complete picture”.142 Disabled peoples’ costs may 
be higher or lower than the value of disability benefits, and they may not be in receipt of 
these benefits at all (meaning they would be substantially poorer than the metric suggests).143 
Basing the calculation on benefit rates could also mean that that poverty levels amongst 
disabled people appear to rise or fall in response to changes to benefit levels—rather than 
because of changes to peoples’ material circumstances.144 Michael Griffin of Parkinson’s 
UK explained that the Commission’s measure is, therefore:
A good start but it is difficult because if you are basing it on the Government’s 
payments, if the Government cut PIP in half you would not see an increase 
in the levels of poverty but we know in reality there would be an increase in 
levels of poverty and particularly hardship.
He continued:
What we would like to see is a regular independent survey to see and check 
what those extra costs of living with a disability are.145
46. The Department told us that disability benefits are “intended to act as a contribution” 
towards the additional costs of disability, and are paid “according to a claimant’s overall 
level of need”.146 Disabled people and organisations that support them told us that these 
benefits often fall short of the real additional costs of having a long-term health condition.147 
The Commission itself recognised that using PIP, DLA and AA as proxies can only 
138 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.7
139 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.135
140 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.137
141 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, pp. 97–98
142 Q160 (Sally West)
143 Q91 (Sally West, Michael Griffin).
144 Q91 (Michael Griffin)
145 Q91 (Michael Griffin). See also CPAG (WSN0116), Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111), Parkinson’s 
UK (WSN0106), Leonard Cheshire (WSN0072), Thomas Pocklington Trust (WSN0021), Scope (WSN0054)
146 WQ232968
147 Q160 (Sally West); Q160 (Michael Griffin), CPAG (WSN0116), Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111), 
Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Leonard Cheshire (WSN0072), Thomas Pocklington Trust (WSN0021), Scope 
(WSN0054)
31 Welfare safety net 
provide a “best estimate”.148 Scope’s 2019 Disability price tag research, for example, found 
that disabled adults face average additional monthly costs of £583 per month. For people 
with some conditions, the costs can be much higher than average: one in five disabled 
people face costs of over £1,000 per month.149 PIP—the most widely-claimed of the three 
benefits—pays between £23.20 per week (approximately £100 per month) and £148.85 per 
week (approximately £645 per month).150 Mind, the mental health charity, concluded that 
benefits for disabled people have “not kept pace with the costs of essentials, particularly 
for people who need long-term support from the social security system”.151 Parkinson’s 
UK said that, compared to a decade ago, “there is much less support to prevent people […] 
falling into poverty and destitution”.152 The Child Poverty Action Group recommended 
the Department focus on the “valuable preventative role” that such benefits have in relation 
to poverty and destitution—particularly when increasing household income through 
work is difficult or impossible.153 This is reflected in the evidence we have received across 
several inquiries.154
47. Disabled people are at higher risk of falling into, and becoming trapped in, 
poverty than non-disabled people. That is, in part, because disabled people frequently 
face additional living costs. These range from basic essentials like food and fuel, to 
the costs of the adaptations and support that are needed to make society accessible. 
Disability benefits such as PIP are intended to help cover those costs and ensure that 
disabled people can participate in the economy and society on an equal footing. But 
benefit rates often fall short of the real costs of disability—and for many disabled 
people, boosting income through work can be difficult or impossible.
48. We recommend that the Department commission an independent survey of the 
additional costs of disability and long-term health conditions. This should be developed 
alongside its new poverty measure as a means of understanding where benefits are 
falling short, and informing policy to address poverty amongst disabled people.
49. The Department says that some of the most severely disabled people will receive 
more support under the current welfare system than they would have before 2010. But 
it has come at the cost of support for people with conditions that, while not the “most 
severe”, can still have a substantial impact on their day-to-day lives and living costs. 
This includes people in the ESA WRAG group and Universal Credit equivalent. These 
claimants have also been subject to freezes and reductions in the generosity of benefits 
they are entitled to—despite the Department itself finding them not “fit for work”. We 
return to this issue in the next chapter.
148 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.46
149 Scope, Disability Price Tag 2019, February 2019
150 £23.20 per week is for the standard rate mobility award only (with no daily living component paid). £148.85 per 
week is the enhanced rate for both the mobility and daily living components. See Gov.uk, PIP.
151 Mind (WSN0095)
152 Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106)
153 Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116)
154 See, for example, Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: support for disabled people; Work and 
Pensions Committee, PIP and ESA Assessments; Work and Pensions Committee, Disability employment gap.
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Gendered and child poverty
50. Witnesses told us that women are more susceptible to poverty than men.155 The 
Women’s Budget Group explained that a key driver of poverty amongst women is the 
“earning differentials between the sexes, gendered contributions to households and typical 
patterns of household finance management”. These mean that poverty affects women 
disproportionately. They told us that caring responsibilities (including childcare) are “at 
the crux” of this inequality:
Gendered expectations about who should take on care responsibilities have 
a significant impact on the employment patterns of women. Women are 
more likely to work part-time or to be economically inactive, and so to 
earn less from paid employment. Women are therefore more likely to be 
financially dependent on men and/or the state.156
Professor Fran Bennett, a member of the Women’s Budget Group, explained further 
that women are “more likely to depend on benefits themselves [than men]”, but they are 
also vulnerable to policy changes because “they are more likely to get benefits for other 
people”—including children.157 Analysis by the House of Commons Library estimated 
the impact of budget measures on men and women since 2010. That showed that, at the 
end of 2017, “86% of savings to the Treasury through tax and benefit changes since 2010 
will have come from women”.158
51. We have already reported on, or are in the process of taking evidence on, several of 
the changes that witnesses identified as leading to particular hardship for women and 
children. They include:
a) The benefit freeze and changes to various up-rating policies. We return to these 
in the next chapter.
b) The benefit cap, which limits the total amount that households can receive 
in benefits. The majority of households subject to the cap are single-parent 
households (74%), of whom 96% were women.159
c) The two-child limit.160 From April 2017, most children born into households 
where there are already two or more children are not eligible for an additional 
child payment under either Child Tax Credit or UC. The Department announced 
in January 2019 that it would not apply the cap retrospectively (ie. to children 
who had been born before April 2017). CPAG nonetheless told us that “you could 
not design a policy better to increase child poverty than this one”.161
155 Q91 (Suzanne Fitzpatrick), Q177 (Fran Bennett); Q132 (Deborah Garvie), Women’s Aid Federation (WSN0049), UK 
Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024)
156 UK Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024)
157 Q177 (Fran Bennett)
158 Keen, R. and Cracknell, R., Estimating the gender impact of tax and benefit changes, House of Commons Library 
briefing paper SN06758, December 2017, p.7
159 Work and Pensions Committee, The benefit cap, p.13
160 Work and Pensions Committee, Two child limit, Twenty-Third Report of Session 2017–19, HC1540, January 2019
161 Q4 (Josephine Tucker)
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52. The Commission’s analysis shows that poverty rates vary substantially between 
different family types.162 Lone parent households are much more likely to be in poverty 
than other types, for example: 52% are poor, compared to just 11% and 9% of couples 
without children and pensioner couples respectively. Rates also vary by work status, 
with 68% of households where there is no adult in work being in poverty, compared to 
just 9% of households where all adults are in work (this will include households without 
children).163 Overall, this equates to around 33% of children living in households below 
the poverty line in the UK 2016/17, compared to the Government’s estimate of 30%.164 The 
Commission noted that while the proportions in poverty are similar between its measure 
and the Governments, it found “large shift” in the composition of poverty towards 
“working age families and in particular, couple families with children”. They explained 
that the composition also shifts towards people with childcare costs.165
53. Childcare costs are one of the “inescapable costs” that the Commission uses in its 
metric. The Commission argues they are “inescapable” in the short-term because many 
families have “little choice but to pay them”, given their working patterns.166 Witnesses 
also drew our attention to the impact of childcare costs on households’ disposable income, 
and on their capacity to work in order to increase their income. The London Child Poverty 
Alliance told us that a lack of affordable childcare represents a “significant financial risk 
to parents in low paid or insecure employment as they face upfront and on-going costs, 
regardless of their earnings or employment status”.167 We have previously concluded that 
making childcare support work well for low-income parents should also be a priority for 
the Government. If DWP is to achieve its aim of getting mothers to contribute the vast 
majority of additional hours in work hours under UC, for example, it will be vital that 
they can access good quality, affordable childcare.168
54. We published our report on UC childcare support in December 2018.169 We received a 
very brief and dismissive response from the Department in March 2019.170 After returning 
the report, asking for it to be reconsidered, we received a reply in June 2019.171 We were 
grateful to the Secretary of State for her personal intervention. The Department rejected 
our central recommendation of paying UC claimants’ childcare costs up-front, but made 
a number of concessions. They included:
a) Re-iterating a commitment made by the Secretary of State in January 2019 to 
ensure that UC claimants are able to access the Jobcentre Plus Flexible Support 
Fund (FSF)—a discretionary fund, controlled by Work Coaches—to cover the 
up-front costs of childcare, if these would otherwise present a barrier to work.172 
The Secretary of State told us this did not represent a change of policy: the FSF 
162 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure for poverty for the UK summary report, September 2018, p.27
163 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure for poverty for the UK summary report, September 2018, p.30
164 House of Commons Library, Poverty in the UK: statistics, p.12
165 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure for poverty for the UK summary report, p.44
166 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK, p.40
167 London Child Poverty Alliance (WSN0065)
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170 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: childcare, December 2018; Government Response to the 
Committee’s report, March 2019, pp.8–13
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could already be used for this purpose. She did not believe, however, “that the 
policy was being implemented as intended”.173 Lucy Collins, a Beauty Technician 
and single parent, suggested the Secretary of State’s belief was correct: she told us 
that the FSF is “the biggest secret in the Jobcentre”.174
b) Committing to report annually on spending and uses of the FSF, including 
for childcare, to give greater transparency over how it is spent.175 The FSF has 
been underspent in every year since its introduction.176 Witnesses to multiple 
inquiries echoed the concerns we heard about the FSF and childcare support: in 
particular, that the FSF is not being consistently made available for its intended 
purposes.177
c) A commitment to provide analysis on the impact of the UC childcare costs 
cap in Summer 2019.178 The caps—the maximum amounts that claimants can 
receive in reimbursement for childcare via UC—have not been uprated since 
2005.179 The Joseph Rowntree Foundation told us that since then, the costs of 
all types of formal childcare across the UK have risen well above the rate of 
inflation, and have outstripped earnings.180 This “makes it extremely difficult 
for families with low earnings to afford full time child care”, because costs can 
exceed the maximum cap.181
55. The Department rejected our recommendation, however, that it should also 
investigate the impact of the maximum reimbursements for childcare in UC.182 The 
maximum reimbursement currently stands at 85% of costs up to the cap—more than the 
70% available under Working Tax Credit.183 But the Resolution Foundation told us that 
in practice, when combined with support via council tax and housing benefit, around 
100,000 of the poorest households on Working Tax Credit were receiving up to 96% of 
their costs under that system. They will face losing some support when they move to UC.184
56. The Centre for Social Justice and Save the Children told us that the Government could 
afford to increase childcare support for low-income households by reducing the support 
available to higher income households: specifically, through Tax-Free Childcare (TFC).185 
TFC can be claimed by households earning up to £200,000. The Resolution Foundation 
noted that despite “very welcome” improvements to UC work incentives in the 2018 
budgets, there is still “some way to go before [UC’s design] sufficiently incentivises work 
173 Letter from the Secretary of State to the Chair, 31 January 2019
174 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: childcare, p.18
175 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: childcare - Government response to the Committee’s Twenty-
fifth report, p.5
176 Letter from the Minister to Committee Chair, 15 Nov 2018
177 See, for example, Work and Pensions Committee, Disability employment gap; Work and Pensions Committee, 
Assistive technology, Tenth report of Session 2017–19, HC673, April 2018; Work and Pensions Committee, The 
future of Jobcentre Plus, Second report of Session 2016–17, HC57, November 2016
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second report, p.11
179 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (UCR0258), CPAG (UCR0263)
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181 Ibid.
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second report, p.11
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for single parents and dual-earning families, and supports pay progression”.186 The Centre 
for Social Justice and Save the Children modelled the impact of allowing reimbursement 
of 100% of allowable costs on these households. They demonstrated that this would result 
in improved work incentives, including for second earners (who are usually women).187 
The Department told us, however, that it would not consider diverting funding from TFC. 
It said:
The £100,000 per parent cap on Tax-Free Childcare ensures that support is 
targeted at the working families who require the most support in order to 
return to work or work more.188
Median earnings in the UK in 2018 were £569 per week: approximately £29,500 per year.189 
It is not at all clear to us how households earning up to £200,000 per year “require the 
most support” in order to increase their incomes through work.
57. Universal Credit claimants are required to pay for childcare upfront, and claim 
the money back from DWP. Initial costs, including deposits, can run to hundreds of 
pounds: costs that may be prohibitive for people with no savings or immediate income. 
The Flexible Support Fund can be used to meet these costs, but the Secretary of State 
has admitted that she cannot be confident that the Fund is being consistently used for 
its intended purposes. The Department’s announcement that it will publish annual 
data on the Fund is very welcome, and will be helpful in understanding how the Fund 
is being used. But it will not, in itself, ensure that it is being used correctly.
58. Universal Credit allows working parents to claim back up to 85% of their childcare 
costs up to a maximum cap. The Department has agreed to analyse the effect of the 
maximum caps, which have not been uprated since 2005. This is very welcome. It will 
not look, however, at the maximum reimbursement rate, which for around 100,000 of 
the poorest families in the system Universal Credit replaces was almost 100%. That 
means that some of the households who need support with childcare the most will lose 
out under Universal Credit.
59. We recommend the Department extend its plans to publish data on the Flexible 
Support Fund to include research on Work Coach and claimant awareness of the Fund 
and its uses. The Department should use this opportunity to find out whether current 
guidance on the Fund is effective, how it can better publicise the Fund, and how it can 
ensure the Fund is being used to its full potential.
60. Childcare is expensive, no matter who pays for it. But DWP could afford to 
increase support for the poorest households—and in doing so, offset an inescapable 
cost of working—if it reduced support to the better off. We have already recommended 
that it diverts funding from Tax Free Childcare, which can be claimed by households 
earning up to £200,000, into Universal Credit. The Department says it will not do this, 
because these households “require the most support in order to return to work or work 
more”. This is absurd.
186 Resolution Foundation (UCM0018)
187 The Centre for Social Justice and Save the Children, A bright start, p.43
188 Universal Credit: childcare - Government response to the Committee’s Twenty-fifth report, para.38
189 Full time weekly earnings. See Smith, R., Employee earnings in the UK: 2018, Office for National Statistics, 
October 2018
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61. We recommend the Department reconsiders its decision not to divert funding from 
wealthier families claiming Tax Free Childcare, into Universal Credit. It should also 
provide in response to this report any analysis it has carried out to inform this decision, 
particularly relating to changes to in work incentives for high earners on Tax Free 
Childcare. We will return to issues relating to childcare and poverty in our joint work 
with the Education Committee.190
Single payments of Universal Credit
62. UC claimants receive their monthly payment in one, single payment per household—
including couple households. Our inquiry on Universal Credit and domestic abuse heard 
that single payments of a whole household’s UC award to one member of a couple can 
exacerbate or encourage financial abuse in a relationship. This can mean the abused 
partner suffers severe hardship, which in turn makes it even more difficult for them to 
leave the relationship.191 The Secretary of State announced in a speech in January 2019 
that she would like to see all UC payments go to the main carer, and that the Department 
would look to introduce this provision “later” in 2019.192 This change of policy would not, 
however, do anything to help people in abusive relationships who do not have children. 
According to a written response to Baroness Lister in February 2019, the Department 
intends to “encourage” couple households with children to use the main carer’s bank 
account for their UC award. It said it would do so by “[improving] the claimant messaging 
on the service”.193
63. As millions more people transfer onto UC, it is essential that payment arrangements 
do not exacerbate financial control within a relationship. The Government needs to act 
with urgency to devise a method for splitting payments fairly within a couple and to 
proceed with it. In the meantime, we recommend that all household Universal Credit 
payments for couples with children should be to the main carer. The Government 
has said only that it will “encourage” claimants to take this option. That means it is 
unlikely to have the wholesale impact the Secretary of State intends, and couples where 
abuse or coercive control is a problem are unlikely to respond to “encouragement”. 
We recommend that, while it devises a system for splitting payments, the Department 
makes all UC payments to main carers by default.
190 See Work and Pensions Committee, School holiday poverty. Inquiry launched June 2019
191 Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit and domestic abuse, pp.18–21
192 Rudd, R., Universal Credit: personal welfare, 11 January 2019
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4 The benefit freeze and up-rating 
changes
64. Some groups of people are more at risk of falling into poverty than others. This is due 
to “inescapable costs” associated with their circumstances. Disabled people frequently 
have higher living costs than non-disabled people, which are not always covered by 
disability benefits.194 Childcare support and payments intended for children are available 
to low income households, but having children can still strain household finances.195 In 
both cases, it can be difficult or impossible for households to make up their income 
through work. The welfare safety net is intended to help offset these risks, and prevent 
households from falling into or becoming stuck in poverty. Supportive policy aimed at 
pensioner households, for example, has been instrumental in reducing poverty for that 
demographic.196 But witnesses told us that, for other groups, the safety net has been 
substantially eroded by policy decisions since 2010.197
Up-rating changes
65. Up-rating (increases to account for inflation) of benefits usually takes place in April 
each year, based on inflation in the previous September.198 In April 2011, the Coalition 
government decided to switch the mechanisms for uprating from the Retail Prices Index 
(RPI) and “Rossi” Index to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI).199 In 2011, the House of 
Commons Library forecast that this measure would save £1.2 billion in its first year, 
increasing to £5.8 billion in 2014/15 and exponentially thereafter.200 Announcing the 
switch, the then-Chancellor argued that increases in welfare spending were “one reason 
why there is no money left” and that excessively generous welfare support (including 
spending on tax credits) was leaving “an increasing number of our fellow citizens trapped 
on out-of-work benefits for their entire lives”.201 Several organisations responding to this 
inquiry noted that the switch has contributed to gradually eroding the value of benefits, 
both collectively and for individual households.202 The Resolution Foundation described 
the shift to CPI as “skimming small amounts each year from the budgets of lower-income 
households, in the hope that you’ll be out the door before they notice”.203
194 Scope (WSN0054)
195 Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024)
196 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary, p.4
197 Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116), Newcastle City Council and Your Homes Newcastle (WSN0092), Mr 
Joel Halligan (WSN0081), Citizens Advice Newcastle (WSN0079), Nordic Model Now! (WSN0064), PCS Union 
(WSN0063), Thomas Pocklington Trust (WSN0021)
198 McInnes, R., 2019 Benefits up-rating, House of Commons Library briefing paper CBP84578, March 2019
199 The CPI tends to rise more slowly than either RPI or the “Rossi” index (RPI without housing costs included. See 
Hood, A. and Norris Keiller, A., A survey of the UK benefit system, Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2016
200 Cracknell, R., The CPI: up-rating benefits and pensions, House of Commons Library research paper 11/05, 
SN5830, 2011
201 Osborne, G., Transcript of the Chancellor’s speech (2010 Emergency Budget), June 2010
202 Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116), SHAL Housing (WSN0048), Depaul UK (WSN0089), Chartered Institute of 
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66. In the 2012 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced that increases in most 
working-age benefits (including benefits for people who are in work) would be limited 
to 1% for three years from 2013/14.204 This was expected to deliver a further £3.7 billion 
saving. CPAG told us that this change, and the RPI-CPI shift, had contributed to “the 
greatest losses to children and families” of all policies since 2010.205
67. The value of benefits, for people in and out of work, has been steadily eroded by 
uprating changes: the shift from RPI to CPI in 2011, and the 1% limit from 2013. Even 
without any further changes, this would have contributed to a reduction in financial 
security for many of the households that DWP supports. This includes people who are 
wholly reliant on benefits, and people who need benefits to top-up income from low-
paid work.
The five-year freezes
68. The 1% up-rating provision was due to end in 2015/16. After that, Government would 
usually have acted to increase working-age benefits in line with inflation.206 The “benefit 
freeze”, however, was introduced via the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016. The Act 
provided for a freeze on most working-age benefits (excluding some disability and carer 
benefits, but including benefits paid to people in work: see Box 8) at 2015/16 levels for five 
years until 2020/21.207 The benefit cap, which limits the total amount that some households 
can receive in income from benefits, has also been frozen in cash terms up to 2020/21.208
Box 8: The benefit freeze
The benefits included in the freeze are:
• Jobseekers’ Allowance;
• ESA personal allowances and the Work-related activity component;
• Income Support;
• Child and Working Tax Credit (non-disability-related elements);
• Housing Benefit Local Housing Allowances (LHA); and
• The equivalents of the above in Universal Credit.
69. The Government justified the various freezes by saying that, since 2008’s financial 
crisis, most benefits had risen in value by 21%, compared to a rise in average earnings of 
11%. The Government therefore said that the freeze was necessary “to ensure it always 
pays to work”.209 When it was announced in 2016, the Treasury said it expected to save 
£3.5 billion via the five year freeze alone by 2019/20.210 The Resolution Foundation says 
that the Department’s savings as a result of the freeze will total £4.4 billion up to 2019/20, 
204 HM Treasury, Autumn statement 2012, CM8480, p.56
205 Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116)
206 McInnes, R., 2019 Benefits up-rating, March 2019
207 Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 7 (s.11)
208 Ibid.
209 Kennedy, S., Honeysett, L., Thurley, D., McInnes, R. and Mackley, A. Spending of the Department for Work and 
Pensions, House of Commons Library debate pack CDP-2019–0053, p.23
210 HM Treasury, Budget 2016, Table 2.2
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compared to if the frozen benefits had been uprated in line with CPI. This is £0.9 billion 
more than projected. The increase in savings is largely due to CPI being higher than 
forecast during the period in which the freeze has applied.211
70. Analysis by the House of Commons Library shows that the effect of the freeze is 
that benefits are worth 6.1% less in cash terms in 2019/20, compared to what they would 
have been worth had the freeze not been introduced.212 Conversely, if frozen benefits had 
been allowed to rise in line with CPI inflation, they would have risen by 6.5% by 2019/20 
compared to 2015/16. The Library measured the cumulative effect of the various benefit 
caps and freezes on lone parent and couple households with one or two children, who 
were both in and out of work.213 They showed these households are:214
a) between £888 and £1,845 per year worse off in 2019/20 than if benefits had been 
up-rated consistently in line with inflation from 2015/16;
b) are between £36 and £723 worse off in real terms in 2019/20 compared to 2010–
11; and
c) have seen a real terms fall in income of between 0.7% and 6.7% between 2010/11 
and 2019/20.
71. Despite substantial losses to claimant households, and the Department having saved 
more than expected, the Secretary of State rejected our request to end the freeze a year 
early, in 2019/20.215 She reiterated that the various freezes are part of the Department’s 
strategy to “put welfare on a more sustainable footing and to shift the balance away from 
benefit dependency towards employment”.216 The Joseph Rowntree Foundation estimated 
that ending the freeze early would have lifted 200,000 people out of poverty, and increased 
the incomes of 13.7 million people by £270 in 2020/21.217
72. Most working-age benefits—including some for people who are too unwell to 
work—have been frozen since 2015/16. For three years before that, the same benefits 
were limited to a 1% increase. The Department has already saved £0.9 billion more 
than it intended via the freeze. Its regrettable decision not to lift the freeze early—
and lift 200,000 people out of poverty—means that very disadvantaged people are still 
losing out. When the freeze ends in 2020/21, a substantial chunk will have been taken 
out of the incomes of some of the country’s most vulnerable households. Simply lifting 
the freeze is not enough.
The 2018 budget
73. The 2018 Budget announced additional spending on UC. This included a £1,000 
increase to UC work allowances (in additional to normal up-rating by CPI: work 
allowances are not frozen): the amount that a household can earn before benefits start 
to be tapered away.218 This means that some households will receive more UC in 2019/20 
211 Resolution Foundation, The Living Standards Outlook 2019, February 2019, page 20
212 Kennedy, S., et al. Spending of the Department for Work and Pensions, pp.23–24
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Q35–38 (Amber Rudd)
216 Letter from the Secretary of State to the Chair of the Committee, 14 March 2019. See also Q35 (Amber Rudd)
217 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (WSN0077)
218 HM Treasury, Budget 2018: Universal Credit, April 2018
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than they would otherwise have done, despite some UC components or ‘elements’ being 
frozen. Responding to our questions on lifting the freeze early, the Department told us 
that it is spending the money it has saved in other areas of its budget. Donna Ward, Policy 
director for Children, Families and Disadvantage at DWP, said:219
If you add up the reduction in the taper, the increase in the work allowances 
and other changes like the HB run-on and everything in 2019–20 [the 
Department] actually does spend as much money as the benefit freeze if 
we lifted that, so it is around £1.5 billion extra in 2019/20 from all of those 
measures.
74. The Department told us, however, that it recognises its additional spending is “aimed 
primarily at people in work”.220 Peabody, a housing association, told us that “claimants 
who cannot work, or who struggle to work” (for example, due to disability/illness or 
caring responsibilities, including for children) are “far less appropriately supported by 
UC” than claimants in work.221 CPAG also pointed out that the money the Department 
has put back into UC in the 2018 Budget—£1.7 billion—is much less than the £3.2 billion 
that was removed from it in the 2015 Budget.222
75. The Department has invested £1.7 billion in restoring Universal Credit to its pre-
2015 generosity. This is much-needed, but it falls short of the £3.2 billion that was taken 
out of the system in 2015. Moreover, the additional spending is tilted towards those 
who are in, or able to move into, work. Investing in Universal Credit work allowances 
and tapers will offer little comfort to people whose capacity to work is limited (for 
example, by their health or by the cost and availability of childcare), and who rely 
solely or largely on benefits to meet the costs of living and keep them out of poverty.
Local Housing Allowance
76. Local Housing Allowance (LHA) is used to determine how much housing benefit 
claimants in the private rented sector are eligible to receive. From its introduction in 2008, 
LHA rates were determined in relation to the cost of private rentals in the local area. 
They were capped at the median—50th percentile—of local market rents. In 2010, the 
then-Government announced changes to LHA in the June Budget and October Spending 
Review.223 They included:
a) reducing the cap from the 50th percentile to the 30th percentile of local market 
rates;
b) changing the method for uprating LHA rates. The existing system of monthly 
uprating was ended, and April 2012 rates were frozen for one year. In April 2013, 
LHA was uprated at the 30th percentile or at CPI (whichever was lower). For 
2014/15, LHA was uprated by the lower of CPI or 1%. Since then 2015/16, LHA 
has been frozen, and not uprated.224
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220 Q38–39 (Donna Ward, Amber Rudd)
221 Peabody (WSN0066)
222 CPAG (WSN0116)
223 See HM Treasury, Budget 2010, HC61, June 2010 and Spending review 2010, Cm7942, October 2010
224 HM Treasury, Budget 2016, Table 2.2
41 Welfare safety net 
77. The Chartered Institute of Housing told us that the cumulative effect of the changes 
to LHA rates and uprating is that “an increasing majority” of private tenants are finding 
there is a “widening gap between the rent they pay and the help they get in their benefit to 
cover it”.225 It said that private tenants are expected to make up any shortfall from income 
or benefits other than housing benefit, because LHA rates are declining in real terms and 
have been since LHA was frozen in 2016.226 Zacchaeus 2000 Trust (Z2k), a London-based 
charity, told us that changes to LHA rates even before the 2015/16 freeze, amongst other 
changes to housing benefit, had contributed substantially to poverty amongst people they 
support. They said that the “vast majority” of tenants affected had been unable to reduce 
their housing costs, and so:227
Were left with a choice of either trying to make up the shortfall from other 
social security benefits, or [allowing] themselves to start falling into arrears 
and face possession action, eviction and potentially homelessness.
78. Analysis by Shelter set out the wider geographical extent of the problem.228 Their 
research examined rent levels across England. It found that, in 2017/18, there was a 
shortfall between LHA and rent levels in 92% of the England for one-bedroom properties. 
This increased to 95% of the country for a two bedroom property (see Figure 1), and 97% 
for three bedroom properties. Shelter described widespread shortfalls relating to LHA 
rates as “the biggest problem” with UC overall.229
Figure 1: Areas in England where there is a shortfall between the LHA rate for a two-bedroom 
property and local market rents
Source: Shelter (WSN0107)
225 Chartered Institute of Housing (WSN0078)
226 Ibid.
227 Zacchaeus 2000 Trust (WSN0115)
228 Shelter (WSN0107). See also: Crisis (WSN0099), Local Government Association (WSN0094), Refuge (WSN0086), 
Chartered Institute of Housing (WSN0078), St Mungos (WSN0070), Homeless Link (WSN0067), Peabody 
(WSN0066), Shelter Scotland (WSN0045), Zacchaeus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), Citizens Advice (WSN0114)
229 Shelter (WSN0107)
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79. Some households may be able to cover the shortfall: for example, through moving 
into work or increasing their hours. As Z2k identified, however, others will struggle to do 
so.230 Shelter told us that this is not a trivial problem: they explained that “recent reforms 
to LHA are contributing significantly towards the rise in poverty and homelessness in the 
UK”. Their evidence set out the extent of the shortfall that some tenants face.231 Deborah 
Garvie, Policy Manager at Shelter told us that shortfalls that occur as a result of LHA not 
covering the full cost of rent are often “not something you can budget around”.232 She 
cited data showing that in 25% of areas in England, families who need a two-bedroom 
home will find that the shortfall is over £100 per month.233 She concluded that “this is not 
a matter of shaving a couple of pounds off your shopping bill or something like that, and 
this is [happening] month after month”.234
80. StepChange, the debt support charity, told us that many of the people that they support 
who have difficulties with debt and housing arrears also have “other vulnerabilities, like 
mental health problems [or] physical health problems”.235 Peter Tutton, Head of Policy 
at StepChange, estimated this applied to around one third of their clients who live in the 
private rented sector. He characterised this group as a “highly vulnerable poor who are 
likely to be in persistent poverty struggling to meet their basic needs”.236 He, and other 
witnesses, concluded that the “problem seems to be growing”.237 Shelter drew attention 
to other groups that are increasingly vulnerable to homelessness as a result of the freeze, 
including single parent households.238 Multiple witnesses told us that due to barriers 
related to disability and to childcare, these groups are amongst those who are less likely 
to be able to make up the shortfall consistently by moving into work, or by working more 
hours.239
81. The Secretary of State acknowledged that there is a gap between LHA rates and rent 
prices in some regions of the UK. She told us that she has “concerns about Local Housing 
Allowance and the impact on affordability in certain areas”.240 She explained that she 
would be working with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local 
Government, James Brokenshire MP, to address the issue. Her proposed solution involved 
working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government so that “we 
address supply and demand together to try to get a better outcome for our constituents”.241
82. The Local Housing Allowance freeze means that there is now a gap between 
housing benefit rates and rent prices in the private sector in the vast majority of English 
local authorities. These shortfalls are not trivial. In some areas, families needing a 
two-bedroom house face a shortfall of over £100 a month. Bridging a gap of this size 
would be hard enough for many people in work. For people who cannot work, it may be 
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simply impossible. The Secretary of State acknowledged the problem. Her solution—
addressing supply and demand—is necessary, but it will take time. Tenants need help 
now. They are not to blame for a mismatch between supply and demand in the housing 
market, and should not be bearing the brunt of it.
The combined impact
83. Witnesses told us that the uprating changes and freezes have had a substantial impact 
both on poverty levels amongst certain groups, and on wider indicators of “destitution” 
such as foodbank use and homelessness.242 We heard repeatedly that benefit levels have 
been low in comparison to living costs for many years, in part due to the impact of other, 
overlapping reforms.243 The current Government’s approach to uprating and freezing 
policies has exacerbated this problem, pushing households into poverty and creating 
additional stresses on household finance.244
84. The Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) said that the five year freeze and the decision 
to uprate benefits by CPI have delivered “the biggest benefit savings” to Government, but 
have “seriously hampered” the UK’s welfare safety net.245 CPAG explained that “already 
low levels of support have been reduced further by [benefits] failing to keep pace with rising 
costs”.246 Professor Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Director of the Institute of Social Policy, Housing 
and Equalities research at Heriot-Watt University explained further the implications for 
people who rely on working age benefits for all or most of their income:247
The chronic problem that is driving destitution and indeed poverty is that 
working-age benefits are paid at far too low a level now and have been for a 
number of years. Obviously, that has been exacerbated by the benefit freeze, 
so they are losing value year-on-year.
What this means is that people living on these benefits, on the working-age 
benefits, are unable to withstand any kind of minor—even very minor—
income or expenditure shock.
85. Shelter and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation emphasised that the risks of poverty 
and homelessness related to the LHA freeze are not confined to households where no 
one is in work.248 The Social Metrics Commission’s measure shows that while poverty 
rates are much higher in households where no one works, almost one in ten households 
with children where all adults work full-time are in poverty. This increases to 37% in 
couple households with children where at least one adult is in part-time, and one in full-
time work, 68% where adults work part-time only, and 88% of couple households where 
no adults works (see Figure 2).249 Shelter’s research further demonstrated that 55% of 
242 See, for example, iSphere (WSN0112), Crisis (WSN0099), Shelter (WSN0107), The Prince’s Trust (WSN0103), 
Nottingham Trent University (WSN0102), Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Highland Council (WSN0093), End Hunger 
UK (WSN0088), Community Links (WSN0076), Advice Nottingham (WSN0069)
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249 Social Metrics Commission, A new measure of poverty for the UK summary report, p.31
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homeless families are employed.250 More widely, Crisis told us that their research showed 
that, had the various reductions in generosity of welfare support planned for 2016 to 2021 
not gone ahead, projected homelessness levels would be 42% less by 2041, assuming that 
no further reductions were implemented in the 2020s.251
Figure 2: Poverty rates for people in working-age families, by family type and work status
Source: Social Metrics Commission, p.31
86. We also heard that freezes and welfare reform were contributing to the use of food 
banks and to hunger and “food insecurity”—people being unable to consistently access or 
afford good quality, healthy food.252 The Department has announced that it will start to 
measure food insecurity in the Family Resources Survey from 2019; a recommendation 
that some of our witnesses made to this inquiry prior to the Department’s announcement.253 
Until this data is available, the clearest large-scale data on hunger in the UK comes from 
food bank networks such as the Trussell Trust—although the Trussell Trust themselves 
cautioned that this data was “unofficial and piecemeal”, likely to understate usage, and 
represented only part of a problem that is “far greater in scope”.254 The Trussell Trust 
told us that the people most likely to need emergency food parcels are “those who have 
been particularly adversely affected by recent welfare benefit reforms”. This includes lone 
parents, disabled people, and households with three or more children.255 They identified 
the benefit freeze and reductions in the value of benefits available to disabled people (for 
example, those in the ESA-WRAG group) as some of the key factors driving food bank 
usage.256
250 Shelter (WSN0107)
251 Crisis (WSN0099)
252 Trussell Trust (WSN0105), Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116), Zacchaeus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), End Hunger 
UK (WSN0088)
253 The Guardian, UK hunger survey to measure food insecurity, February 2019. See A Menu for Change (WSN0091), 
Trussell Trust (WSN0105)
254 Trussell Trust (WSN0105)
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
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Figure 13 demonstrates how people in poverty in the UK are split between retired, working (of various 
work intensities) and workless families. The poverty rates amongst people living in workless families 
(68.0%) is seven and a half times higher than the rate amongst people in families where all adults work 
full time (9.0%). Where all adults work the equivalent of part-time hours, the poverty rate is 55.3%.
Figure 14 shows that, whilst still relatively low, the rate of poverty for people in full-work families 
has risen by nearly two percentage points since 2001. The rates of poverty for people in workless 
families have declined by over five percentage points over the same period.
Sources: Family Resources Survey and HBAI dataset (1998/99–2016/17), SMC Analysis.
Figure 15 demonstrates how p v rty rates vary for working-age a ults and c ild en living in 
different family types and by family work statu . Nearly nine in ten (88.4%) people in working-age, 
out-of-work couple families are in poverty. Around one in four (26.0%) of people in full-ti e 
working lone-parent families are in poverty. This rises to 63.3% when the lone parent works part 
time. At the other end of the scale, just 3.3% of people living in couple families with no children, 
where both adults work, are in poverty.
Sources: Family Resources Survey and HBAI dataset (2016/17), SMC Analysis.
Notes: Full/part-time working families are where the adults in the family work a combination of full and part-time. This is 
possible in single-adult families where they are living in a sharing unit with other benefit units. See full report for more details.
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87. We heard overwhelmingly that the various freezes currently in place must end as 
scheduled in 2020/21.257 Several organisations also supported our request to the Secretary 
of State to end the freezes earlier.258 Shelter told us that a failure to lift the freezes would 
mean that the welfare safety net would continue to be weakened “in its ability to stop 
people falling into debt, destitution and homelessness”.259 They said that the LHA freeze, 
in particular, must end, with benefit rates recalibrated back to the 30th percentile “at the 
very least” and uprated thereafter.260 The Trussell Trust, and many others, told us that 
the Department should end the wider freeze and continue to uprate benefits in line with 
inflation.261 They recommended the Department particularly focus on restoring value, 
and ensuring adequacy, in benefits for children and disabled people. They said this was 
necessary due to “the additional inescapable costs upon families” that result from caring 
for children, or from having a health condition.262
88. Crisis, the homelessness charity, pointed out that lifting the LHA freeze without also 
lifting the freeze on the benefit cap will mean that “a greater number of people’s overall 
income will exceed the benefit cap”.263 This could also apply to unfreezing other benefits 
that are included in the cap. Crisis recommended that to address this, there should be 
“increased flexibility to lift the benefit cap” in some circumstances: for example, where 
a claimant subject to the cap is expected to need long-term support via Discretionary 
Housing Payments to avoid becoming homeless. They said that this is “likely to include 
single parents with young children” and “people at risk of homelessness where illness and 
disability create a barrier to entering work”.264 Other witnesses advocated uprating the 
cap in line with inflation. We have already recommended to Government that the cap 
should not apply at all to people who the Department does not expect to look for work (for 
example, because they have small children or are disabled).265
89. Most benefits for working-age people have been frozen since 2015/16. The outcome 
is that already low benefit rates have become divorced from the real costs of living. 
People who cannot boost their incomes sufficiently through work—and who may find 
that work itself incurs additional costs (such as childcare)—face enormous, on-going 
challenges in simply meeting their basic day-to-day needs. The welfare safety net is not 
fit for purpose for people living on the breadline.
90. The Government plans to lift the benefit freeze in 2020/21. That is a necessary first 
step, but it will not be sufficient to reconnect benefit rates with the cost of living. Nor 
will it allow those who have built up debts during the freeze to begin to pay them off.
257 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (WSN0077), Zaccheaus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), Trussell Trust (WSN0105), 
Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Citizens Advice Newcastle (WSN0079), Peabody (WSN0066), PC Union (WSN0063), 
Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), Advice NI (WSN0007), Shelter Scotland (WSN0045), Child Poverty Action 
Group (WSN0116)
258 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (WSN0077), Zaccheaus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), Trussell Trust (WSN0105)
259 Shelter (WSN0107), Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), Shelter Scotland (WSN0045)
260 Shelter (WSN0107)
261 Trussell Trust (WSN0105). See also: Joseph Rowntree Foundation (WSN0077), Zaccheaus 2000 Trust (WSN0115), 
Citizens Advice Newcastle (WSN0079), Women’s Budget Group (WSN0024), Chartered Institute of Housing 
(WSN0078)
262 Trussell Trust (WSN0105)
263 Crisis (WSN0099)
264 Crisis (WSN0099)
265 Work and Pensions Committee, The benefit cap.
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91. We recommend that, from 2020/21, the Government should increase the rates of 
frozen benefits by CPI plus 2%. That would mean that benefit rates would, after 4 years, 
reach the level at which they would have been set if they had not been frozen. From that 
point, the Department should commit to uprating benefits at least in line with inflation.
92. We also recommend that the Department unfreeze Local Housing Allowance as 
planned in 2020/21, and restore rates to at least the 30th percentile of local market rates. 
Thereafter, the Department should commit to uprating Local Housing Allowance in line 
with rental prices.
93. We remain of the view that the benefit cap should not apply to people who the 
Department does not expect to work, including single parents with small children 
and disabled people. We recommend that where the benefit cap does apply, it should be 
unfrozen and uprated in line with inflation.
94. These measures, while necessary in the short term, will not address the fundamental 
problem: that benefit rates and caps have been set without reference to real household 
costs—the amount of money that people actually need to live on. We recommend that 
the Department produce a medium-term plan for linking the rate at which benefits are 
set with the real cost of living. It should set out how it plans to identify a method for 
doing this, and how long it expects this work to take.
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5 Impact and accountability
95. The Department’s decision to adopt and develop the Social Metric Commission’s 
poverty measure should help it to improve its understanding of poverty levels amongst 
different groups. Witnesses, including Baroness Stroud, also told us that adopting the 
measure would, in itself, help the Department focus on the impact of its policies on poverty 
by providing clear accountability for its decisions.266 But several organisations told us that 
the Department needs to demonstrate a greater commitment to transparency and to fully 
understanding the impact of its policies—throughout their implementation.267 In relation 
to UC and some disability benefits, we heard that a lack of clarity and transparency has 
damaged claimant confidence in the Department to such an extent that some people 
who would be entitled to benefits are not applying for them.268 The Department itself 
recognises that a lack of trust in its services poses a risk to its stated goals of improving 
take-up of benefits and ensuring that vulnerable people do not fall through the safety net.269
Understanding the impact of DWP policies
96. An impact assessment is an analysis of a proposed new policy, or of a substantial 
change to an existing policy. Government impact assessments generally set out the 
problem the policy is intended to address; the objectives of the policy and its intended 
effects; and the other options that were considered when deciding on the policy. Equality 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) are also analyses of policy proposals. They consider specifically 
whether the policy has a disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics 
under the Equality Act 2010. Protected characteristics include disability, age and gender. 
Public authorities are not required to carry out EIAs, but they are one way in which an 
authority can demonstrate that it has complied with the Public Sector Equality Duty. This 
is the part of the Equality Act which requires public authorities to “have due regard to 
the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good 
relations between different people when carrying out their activities”.270
97. Our recent inquiries into UC have demonstrated a lack of confidence among claimants 
and stakeholders (such as charities or support organisations) that the Department fully 
understands the impact that the policy is having, including on groups with protected 
characteristics.271 The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the non-
departmental public body that is responsible for promoting equality in England, Scotland 
and Wales, pointed out that the most recent EIA for UC was carried out in 2011; there 
have been a great many changes to UC since then. It “contained limited detailed evidence 
on specific protected groups”.272 The section on impact on poverty, for example, was just 
266 Q3 (Baroness Stroud); Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111), Citizens Advice (WSN0114)
267 Citizens Advice (WSN0114), Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111), Liverpool City Council 
(WSN0100), London Plus (WSN0096), Inclusion London (WSN0053)
268 Q11 (M - Universal Credit and survival sex), Q78 (Blair Buchanan), Ulster University (WSN0068), Inclusion London 
(WSN0053)
269 Q187 (Justin Tomlinson)
270 Gov.uk, Review of public sector Equality Duty, accessed July 2019
271 See, for example, Work and Pensions Committee, Universal Credit: Support for disabled people, Equality and 
Rights Commission (WSN0111), Citizens Advice (WSN0114), Inclusion London (WSN0053), NHS Health Scotland 
(WSN0074), London Child Poverty Alliance (WSN0065), Women’s Aid Federation (WSN0049), London Plus 
(WSN0096)
272 Equality and Rights Commission (WSN0111)
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two paragraphs long, and provided little in the way of context or detailed forecasts of the 
impact of the policy.273 The 2012 impact assessment contains some further detail, but 
policy changes since then mean this is now out of date (see Box 9).274
Box 9: Impact assessments and evidence: Universal Credit
DWP’s 2012 impact assessment of UC said that once UC was in a “steady state”: 
“approximately 2.8 million households will have notionally lower entitlement than 
they otherwise would have done as a result of Universal Credit, although the majority 
of these will have a reduction of less than £100 per month. The average reduction in 
entitlement for this group is estimated to be £137 per month.”
Since 2012 there have various changes to UC, including to the generosity of work 
allowances, and to the taper. In 2017 the Resolution Foundation claimed that UC 
“will, overall, make working families worse off than the current system”. 2.2 million 
families were expected to make a net average increase of £41 per week and 3.2 million 
families with an average loss of £48 per week (almost £200 per month). Following 
the 2018 Budget changes to UC—namely the £1,000 increase in work allowances—
the Resolution Foundation predicted that the number of families gaining from UC 
would increase to 2.4 million. Policy and Practice predicted, however, that even after 
changes were made in the 2018 Budget, 39.9% of households would lose income under 
UC, with 30.3% gaining.
Source: < DWP, Universal Credit: impact assessment; Resolution Foundation, Universal Remedy; Policy in Practice, Autumn 
Budget report>
98. The Department told us that it has a good understanding of the impact of its policies. 
It said in correspondence that, although a full impact assessment of UC has not been 
published since 2012, the Department has published assessments of changes to the new 
system.275 These include a 2015 assessment of the impact of changes to conditionality for 
carers, and an assessment of the “two child limit”.276 The Department has also published 
two surveys of UC claimants’ experiences with the benefit, and an early analysis of 
its employment impact.277 Donna Ward, Policy Director for Children, Families and 
Disadvantage at DWP, told us that the Department is “very transparent” about “the 
impact of its policies on people”.278 Neil Couling, Director General for Universal Credit, 
also pointed to “an evaluation of Universal Credit strategy which we have published”, 
which he claimed was “very comprehensive”.279
99. The EHRC disagreed. They said that since the main impact assessments for UC were 
published in 2011 and 2012:
Significant changes have been made to the new benefits system which 
make it extremely difficult for the implications of Universal Credit on the 
273 DWP, Universal Credit: equality impact assessment, November 2011, p.14
274 DWP, Universal Credit: impact assessment, December 2012
275 Letter from the Secretary of State to the Committee Chair, February 2019
276 DWP, Impact assessment of the change in conditionality for responsible carers on Universal Credit, July 2015; 
DWP, Impact assessment of Tax Credit and Universal Credit, changes to Child Element and Family Element, July 
2015
277 DWP, Universal Credit employment impact analysis: update, September 2017; DWP, Universal Credit Full Service 
omnibus survey, February 2019; DWP, Universal Credit Full service survey, June 2018.
278 Q229 (Donna Ward)
279 Q264 (Neil Couling); DWP, Universal Credit evaluation framework 2016, July 2016
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lives of people sharing protected characteristics to be understood and for 
mitigating measures to be put in place to protect people falling into severe 
hardship as a result of welfare reform measures.280
100. We also heard that it is important not to look at changes to UC in isolation. Witnesses 
including Citizens Advice and the EHRC pointed out that UC—and the changes to it since 
its introduction—is just one part of a much wider programme of welfare reform.281 Citizens 
Advice said that “a significant number of claimants will have been or will be experiencing 
more than one change to the benefits they receive”. They noted that claimants’ ability to 
“cope with the cumulative impact of these changes will vary depending on individual 
circumstances, but many thousands of people will have seen their income reduced, in 
some cases substantially”.282 We heard that if DWP is to fully understand the impact of its 
reform programme, it needs to conduct a cumulative impact assessment.283 When we put 
this to the Department, however, it said that cumulative assessments are done by “other 
people”.284 The Department does not conduct its own cumulative assessments because:
That kind of analysis looks at those policy changes in isolation and does not 
take any account of people changing their behaviour—most importantly in 
this situation, going in to work.285
101. DWP’s decisions have a direct impact on the incomes of millions of people. 
Universal Credit (and the changes to it since impact assessments were published in 
2011/12) may be the highest profile of these decisions, but many hundreds of thousands 
of people if not more will be coping with multiple changes to the benefits they receive. 
DWP says it does not conduct cumulative impact assessments because they do not look 
at the effect of reform on behaviour. It also says that it has a transparent evaluation 
strategy for Universal Credit. But we are not convinced that these arguments justify 
a lack of transparency or understanding of the cumulative effect of reforms on 
households’ incomes.
102. We recommend the Department publish an updated impact assessment of Universal 
Credit, taking into account policy changes since 2011/12. It should illustrate this with 
anonymised case studies and worked examples which demonstrate the impact on 
individual claimants with a range of different circumstances. We also recommend that 
the Department commission and publish a cumulative impact assessment on the effect 
of welfare reform since 2010 on claimant incomes. This should set out clearly the impact 
on incomes of people with protected characteristics (for example, health/disability, 
gender, and age).
280 Equality and Rights Commission (WSN0111)
281 Equality and Rights Commission (WSN0011), Citizens Advice (WSN0114), Inclusion London (WSN0053), Local 
Government Association (WSN0094), Changing Lives (WSN0043)
282 Citizens Advice (WSN0114)
283 Equality and Rights Commission (WSN0111), Citizens Advice (WSN0114), Inclusion London (WSN0053), Just Fair 
(WSN0042), Parkinson’s UK (WSN0106), Liverpool City Council (WSN0100), MS Society (WSN0082), Community 
Links (WSN0076), NHS Health Scotland (WSN0074), London Child Poverty Alliance (WSN0065), Women’s Aid 
Federation (WSN0049),
284 Q265 (Donna Ward)
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What claimants can expect from DWP
103. DWP has a “Customer Charter”. The Charter briefly sets out what claimants can 
expect from the Department under four headings: “right treatment”, “getting it right”, 
“keeping you informed” and “easy access” (see Figure 3).286 The Charter has been in place 
since 2014. Up until December 2017, it was accompanied by a leaflet: About the Department 
for Work and Pensions: our service standards. This set out in slightly more detail what 
claimants could expect from DWP. It included some time-bound commitments: for 
example, maximum times for responding to letters, complaints, and letters from MPs, 
and for the Department to provide interpreters for claimants who require them. It also 
included detail on home visits and accessibility for disabled claimants, and told claimants 
how they could complain if they needed to.287 The leaflet was withdrawn in 2017. Visitors 
to the Gov.uk site looking for the service standards are currently redirected to the less 
detailed Charter.288
286 DWP, Our customer charter, updated March 2014
287 DWP, [Withdrawn] About the DWP: our service standards, updated November 2014
288 Gov.uk, About the DWP: our service standards: leaflet, updated December 2017
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Figure 3: DWP’s Customer Charter
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-customer-charter/our-customer-charter
© Crown copyright 2014 
This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where 
otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-
licence/version/3 (https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3) or write to 
the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: 
psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk. 
Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission 
from the copyright holders concerned. 
This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-customer-
charter/our-customer-charter 
You told us what is i portant to you.
Right treatment
You can trust us to:
• do what we say we will do
• be helpful, polite, and treat you fairly and with respect
• try to understand your circumstances
• follow processes correctly
• tell you what to do next if you’re not satisﬁed with how you’ve been treated
• protect your personal information (our personal information charter
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-work-pensions/about/personal-
information-charter) tells you more)
• investigate all reports of fraud, to protect public money
Getting it right
We will:
• provide you with the correct decision, information or payment
• explain things clearly if the outcome is not what you’d hoped for
• say sorry and put it right if we make a mistake
• use your feedback to improve how we do things
Page 2 of 3Our customer charter - GOV.UK
17/07/2019https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-customer-charter/our-customer-char...
Keeping you informed
We will:
• deal with your request the ﬁrst time you contact us, or as soon as we can
• tell you what will happen next, and by when
• keep you updated of progress
Easy access
We will:
• make more of our services available online, to use at a time that suits you
• publish information about beneﬁts and services online at GOV.UK
• explain clearly how to contact us in other ways
In return, we need you to:
• give us the correct information at the right time
• tell us when something changes
• be on time for any appointments
• treat our staff with respect
Page 3 of 3Our customer charter - GOV.UK
17/07/2019https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-customer-charter/our-customer-char...
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104. The Department also has a Single Departmental Plan which sets out its objectives 
and how it aims to achieve them. The Single Departmental Plan was last updated in 
April 2019.289 The EHRC told us that the Single Departmental Plan does include a list 
of objectives that DWP could, if it was minded to, use to measure its own performance.290 
For example, it contains objectives on “efficient benefit processing”.291
105. The EHRC told us it was concerned that the current Customer charter “does not 
contain specific measures such as targets or minimum standards”.292 For example, where 
the Service standards leaflet contained some timeframes for responses to customer 
complaints, comments or queries, the Charter simply says that the Department will try 
to deal with issues “the ﬁrst time you contact us, or as soon as we can”.293 Similarly, the 
objectives in the Single Departmental Plan are not accompanied by any targets, timeframes 
or specific commitments. For example:
• On “efficient benefit processing”, the plan says that DWP will “improve 
further the service we offer claimants within Universal Credit by changing 
how jobcentres and service centres work together, as well as developing our 
outreach offer locally”. The Department collects and publishes data on aspects 
of UC, including the proportion of claimants paid on time and in full. The Plan, 
however, contains no commitment to specific levels of payment timeliness.294 
There is therefore no penalty for poor performance. For example, the National 
Audit Office estimated that between 270,000 and 338,000 UC claimants would 
be paid late during 2018.295
• Under “[Completing] the roll-out of Universal Credit”, the Department says it 
will complete transfer of claimants via managed migration “by 2022” [sic.] and 
will implement support for claimants announced in the Autumn 2018 budget.296 
The Department has so far refused to say what successfully transferring claimants 
to UC would look like, nor how it will judge whether the additional resources are 
giving claimants the support they need.297
• On providing “an outstanding service to our customers and claimants”, the 
Department says it will “deliver a highly capable, engaged workforce”, and will 
“design and deliver high performing and financially efficient digital services”.298 
It measures this via the Claimant service and experience survey (see below). 
There is no indication of what the Department considers to be an acceptable or 
unacceptable level of service.
289 DWP, DWP Single departmental plan, updated April 2019
290 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
291 DWP, DWP Single departmental plan
292 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
293 DWP, Our customer charter, updated March 2014
294 DWP, DWP Single departmental plan 2018 to 2022, headline indicators, updated April 2019
295 National Audit Office, Rolling out Universal Credit, p.8
296 DWP, DWP Single departmental plan
297 See Work and Pensions Committee, Managed migration, Twentieth report of Session 2017–19, HC 1762, 
November 2018 and Work and Pensions Committee, Tests for Managed migration, Twenty-sixth report of 
Session 2017–19, HC 2091, April 2019
298 DWP, DWP Single departmental plan
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106. Each year DWP publishes a Claimant service and experience survey.299 The Survey 
records satisfaction with various aspects of DWP services among claimants of 10 different 
benefits. These include communication, digital services, and Jobcentre Plus. While the 
most recent survey (2017/18) does “[highlight] which of the four areas of DWP’s Customer 
charter the data relate to” (“ease of use”, “getting it right”, “keeping you informed” and 
“right treatment”), there is no inherent link between the data and the Charter, and no 
minimum standards or targets are set out.300
107. The Department is much clearer about what it expects from people who are claiming 
benefits. When it is fully rolled out, UC will have the largest caseload of any working-age 
DWP benefit. All UC claimants are required to sign a “Claimant commitment”. This sets 
out in detail what the Department expects claimants to do in order to keep receiving 
UC. The Commitments are specific and time-limited (see Figure 4). People cannot claim 
UC without signing a Claimant commitment. Failure to keep to the conditions set out 
in the Commitment can lead to a sanction, the terms of which are also set out in the 
Commitment.301
299 DWP, Claimant service and experience survey 2017 to 2018, January 2019
300 DWP, Claimant service and experience survey 2017 to 2018, January 2019, p.1
301 An example Claimant commitment is available on gov.uk.
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Figure 4: An example Claimant Commitment
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Joanne Brown
National Insurance number: AB123456C    
1.  My commitment 
I’ll do everything I can to get paid work, and will receive Universal Credit payments to support 
me in this. The things I’ll do are set out in this Claimant Commitment. 
2.  Finding and taking work 
I’ll look for and take any work I’m able to do, that:
 pays £6.19 an hour or more  
 is within 90 minutes' travel from my home
I’m available for work for 40 hours each week. I can work on any day at any time. 
I will: 
 apply for vacancies I’m told to apply for by my adviser  
 attend and take part fully in job interviews I’m offered 
 take up offers of paid work that I’m able to do
If, without good reason, I don’t do all these things, my Universal Credit payments will be cut by 
£10.20 a day for up to 3 years. 
I will be available to: 
 attend a job interview immediately 
 start work immediately
If, without good reason, I’m not available as described, my Universal Credit payments will be cut 
by £10.20 a day for up to 91 days. 
3. My actions for getting into work 
My work search and preparation plan lists the things I’ll do to give me the best chance of finding 
work quickly. This means I will normally spend 35 hours each week looking and preparing for 
work.
I will: 
 complete all the activities in Section 1 of my work search and preparation plan 
 provide evidence that I’ve done my regular work search activities when required 
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If, without good reason, I don’t do all these things, my Universal Credit payments will be cut by 
£10.20 a day for up to 91 days. 
I will also: 
 complete all the actions and activities in Section 2 of my work search and  
preparation plan 
 attend and take part in appointments with my adviser when required 
If, without good reason, I don’t do all these things, my Universal Credit payments will be cut by 
£10.20 for each day until I: 
 complete each action or another activity I’ve been told to do instead by my adviser; or 
 arrange a new appointment 
Once I’ve done this, my payments will be cut by £10.20 a day for a further period of up to 28 
days.
If, without good reason, I don’t apply for any specific jobs my adviser has told me to, as listed in 
Section 2 of my work search and preparation plan, my Universal Credit payments will be cut by 
£10.20 a day for up to 3 years.
I understand that Universal Credit may ask employers for feedback on: 
 my applications for jobs 
 job interviews I’m invited to.  
  Page 3 of 4 
4.  Changes in my circumstances
I’ll tell Universal Credit immediately about any changes in my circumstances that could affect 
my claim.
If I’m in paid work at any time, I’ll tell Universal Credit if my job ends, within 5 days of 
leaving. I must make sure all my earnings are reported to Universal Credit, either by me 
or by my employer.  
If, without good reason, I leave paid work or lose pay, either by choice or because of 
misconduct, my Universal Credit payments could be cut by £10.20 a day for up to 3 years. 
If, without good reason, I don’t tell Universal Credit within 5 working days that I’ve left a job, my 
Universal Credit payments will be cut by £10.20 for each further day that I don’t tell Universal 
Credit I’ve left that job. Once I’ve done this, my payments will be cut by £10.20 a day for a 
further period of up to 28 days.  
If I also have earnings from self-employment at any time, I’ll tell Universal Credit the 
details of my self-employed income and expenses. I’ll do this each month through the 
Universal Credit phone service. I’ll be told what date I have to do this by each month, and I 
won’t get my Universal Credit payments until I’ve done it. If I still haven’t reported my self-
employed income and expenses one month after this deadline, my Universal Credit claim will
be stopped. 
I must give Universal Credit information that I believe is correct and complete. I understand that 
if I don’t report any changes that affect my Universal Credit claim as soon as possible, I may be 
prosecuted or other action may be taken against me. I also understand that I may have to pay a 
£50 penalty if there is an overpayment of Universal Credit to me and it was my fault.
5. Meeting my commitment 
Jobcentre Plus will give me help and advice to support me in doing the things set out in my 
Claimant Commitment. I know how to contact Jobcentre Plus. 
I’ll phone Universal Credit in advance on 0845 600 0723 if I can’t attend an appointment when   
I should. 
If I don’t meet all the requirements set out in my Claimant Commitment, I understand that my 
Universal Credit payments will be cut. The number of days they’re cut for will depend on: 
 how many times I haven’t met my requirements in the previous 12 months 
 which requirements I haven’t met 
I understand that the penalty rates for Universal Credit may change from time to time. The 
current rates at any given time will automatically apply to this Claimant Commitment. If there is 
any doubt about my claim it will be reviewed, which could lead to my Universal Credit payments 
being reduced or stopped. If a decision is made to reduce or stop my payments, this will be 
explained to me. If I disagree with the decision, I have the right to have it reconsidered or to 
appeal against it.
Signature…………………………………………………………………Date…………………………
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My work search and preparation plan 
I’ll spend 35 hours each week looking and preparing for work. This will include all the 
activities and actions in this plan.  
Section 1: Regular work search activities:  How often 
 Check the Nottingham Post on a Wednesday and Saturday and 
apply for any suitable jobs  
2 times a week 
 Keep in contact with RetailChoice Employment Agency and take 
suitable jobs that arise       
2 times a week 
 Check the “Fish for Jobs” website and apply for suitable jobs 2 times a week 
 Cold call employers located within 90 minutes travelling distance 
of my home by visiting, telephoning and sending speculative 
written applications/CVs 
4 times a week 
 Check Universal Jobmatch account and apply for all suitable 
matched jobs
2 times a week 
Section 2: Specific actions I will take: By Review 
 Attend IT course starting w/c 11 Feb 2013 – one 
day per week           
11/02/2013 06/03/2013 
 Present a tailored CV to premises – Costcutter, 
Highland Pharmacy, The Fine Plaice and Turrets 
Hotel
06/03/2013 06/03/2013 
 Present a  tailored CV to each of the retail shops 
In Gallowtree Gate and the High Street
06/03/2013 06/03/2013 
 
Section 3: Other work-related activities: By  Review 
 Do voluntary work at Help For Heroes 2 days 
per week (8 hours) 
 Attend community work club – Grass Street 
(Tue/Thurs)
Source: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/548838/foi-
3786–13-eg-claimant-commitment-annex1.pdf
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108. The Social Metrics Commission’s approach to measuring poverty—which the DWP 
has adopted—is underpinned by a conviction that “what gets measured gets done”. 
That also applies to the service that claimants receive from DWP. The Department 
is clear about what it expects from claimants, but vague about what claimants can 
expect from it in return. It lacks any kind of publicly available, measurable targets 
for its own performance. Unless the Department defines what is “acceptable” and 
measures whether that is being achieved, it cannot confidently claim to be delivering a 
consistently high-quality service.
Introducing service standards and an independent regulator
109. The EHRC concluded in its evidence submission to our inquiry that DWP’s existing 
methods of monitoring standards are inadequate.302 It described the Department’s current 
system—covering the Single Departmental Plan, the Customer Charter and the Claimant 
Service and Experience Survey—as “not fit for purpose in terms of monitoring standards 
and driving improvements”. The EHRC pointed out that DWP’s working-age services are 
also not subject to the consistent “external or independent scrutiny in the same way that 
other Departments are”.303 Other major components of the welfare state do have this kind 
of scrutiny via external regulators and clear performance measures. Ofsted monitors the 
Department for Education’s services, for example, while the Care Quality Commission 
and NHS Improvement monitor the Department for Health and Social Care.304
110. The Department has told us several times that it believes UC has an “image problem”. 
In some cases, this is putting people off applying for it all. The Minister identified 
improving take-up amongst people who are eligible for UC as one of the key challenges 
that the Department faces, and an important element of reducing poverty.305 Neil Couling 
told us that the Department has “further to go” in reassuring claimants that they will be 
supported under UC. He explained he was keen to see more stories about “the reality of 
Universal Credit and Jobcentres rather than the way they are depicted in the media”.306 To 
this end, the Department has been hesitant to accept evidence of claimant difficulty that it 
regards as “anecdote”, and which the former Secretary of State, Rt Hon Esther McVey MP, 
described as “scaremongering”.307 It has also recently invested in a series of advertisements 
in the Metro newspaper, setting out “myths” and “facts” about the benefit (see Figure 5).308
302 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111 and WSN0124)
303 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
304 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
305 See, for example, Q187 (Justin Tomlinson); Work and Pensions Committee, DWP questioned on advertising 
spend to boost UC image, May 2019
306 Q267 (Neil Couling)
307 See, for example DWP (UCX0015); NAO, Rolling out Universal Credit, p.49; HC Deb, 15 October 2018, c391
308 Work and Pensions Committee, DWP questioned on advertising spend to boost UC image, May 2019
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Figure 5: DWP’s Universal Credit advertorial
Source: Metro newspaper, 22 May 2019
111. We put it to the Department that unless it is clear and upfront about what it thinks is 
acceptable service and whether and how it is delivering this, there is a risk that claimants 
and would-be claimants will continue to view its services with suspicion. Neil Couling 
responded:
The 2000s, and indeed the 1990s and 1980s, were a very target-driven world, 
and that is deeply engrained into the culture of Jobcentre Plus, having led 
it for two years. We have been trying to turn that around. Universal Credit 
really helps with that because it gives Work Coaches greater powers to do 
things and make judgments based on the people in front of them rather 
than what it says in the book. You have heard me in this Committee before 
perhaps occasionally baulk at a suggestion that is very well-intentioned but 
might inadvertently reinforce that latent target culture.309
112. The Department’s lack of specific service standards and measurable performance 
targets was a concern for the EHRC. They noted that currently, Jobcentre staff have a 
“high degree of discretion”: for example, in deciding whether to refer a claimant for a 
sanction, or deciding whether to apply an easement to their claim.310 They agreed with 
Neil Couling that some discretion and flexibility can be helpful (for example, in setting 
conditionality). They said, however, that the current way of working had led to “significant 
variation” in the service offered in each Jobcentre. This “can also lead to a wide variety of 
practice which is experienced by claimants as unfair”.311
309 Q267 (Neil Couling)
310 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
311 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
57 Welfare safety net 
113. The EHRC told us that “one way of ensuring non-discriminatory access and fair 
treatment” is to introduce clear service standards that set out what claimants can expect 
from the Department.312 Julie Jarman, Principal for the EHRC’s Living Standards 
programme, argued that introducing such standards could also have the effect of driving 
up service quality and acting as a “preventative measure” against poverty and destitution.313 
She explained that the key principle behind service standards and targets is that they 
are “publicly available and measured”.314EHRC recommended DWP should publish 
“statistical evidence of its performance”, as is the case with services such as health and 
education.315 The EHRC’s initial suggestions for service standards are set out in Box 10. 
They said, however, that specific targets would need to be “developed by the Department 
with relevant stakeholders”.316
Box 10: Suggested service standards
The EHRC suggested the following service standards for DWP:
• Claim processing times for each benefit, and for Work Capability Assessments 
and PIP assessments;
• Appeal and Mandatory Reconsideration processing times;
• Response times for claimants contacting the Department: for example, how 
soon a letter will be replied to; a maximum call waiting time; or responses to 
UC journal entries;
• The proportion of people who request home visits that receive them, and in 
what timeframe;
• Accurate call logging of, for example, claimants’ explanations of why they 
cannot attend an interview, and a system of assurance that this information is 
passed on to the relevant Work Coach;
• A series of communication standards informing claimants about available 
easements; home visits; getting information in accessible formats; the 
availability of private rooms in Jobcentres to discuss any sensitive information; 
and
• Information for claimants who are sanctioned within 48 hours in their 
preferred format (email, text, letter). This should include the reason for the 
sanction, their right to appeal, and how to apply for a hardship payment.
Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
114. We also heard there “could be a case” for establishing an independent regulator to 
monitor the quality of service provided by DWP—especially in Jobcentre Plus.317 The 
EHRC said, however, that this idea would require “further scoping and research”. They 
suggested that in the interim:
312 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
313 Q59 (Julie Jarman)
314 Q61 (Julie Jarman)
315 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
316 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
317 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
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Service standards could be monitored by a distinct internal review 
body within DWP, working closely with Jobcentre Plus (akin to NHS 
Improvement). The introduction of an external advisory board would 
increase confidence in the impartiality of this body. Over time, the functions 
carried out by this unit would be transferred to a distinct agency or non-
departmental body.318
115. Without clear, measurable standards of service, claimants have little way of 
understanding whether the service they have received from DWP is acceptable. The 
Department also lacks the tools to understand whether it is consistently delivering a 
good service—because it has not defined what “good” is. We, the National Audit Office, 
and the Social Security Advisory Committee have all repeatedly asked the Department 
to do this. The Department, reasonably, wants to maintain flexibility in the service it 
delivers to claimants. But that applies equally to other public services such as health 
and education, where standards are independently monitored and measured. DWP, 
and Jobcentre Plus, is not a special case.
116. We recommend the Department work with its stakeholders including claimants 
and delivery partners, including Citizens Advice, to establish suitable performance 
measures for its working-age benefit delivery and to implement these. The measures 
should be published and accompanied by clear targets, and monitored initially by an 
internal review body and external advisory board. We recommend that alongside this 
the Department scopes whether there is a case for establishing an independent regulator 
for working age benefits and services. It should set out an interim assessment in response 
to this report.
318 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
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6 Conclusion
117. The welfare safety net is about more than income, and more than DWP’s policies. 
But the DWP has a vital role to play in maintaining its integrity, simply because its 
decisions affect the incomes of so many households. Successive Governments have 
made huge savings from almost a decade of changes to uprating policies and freezes. 
The corollary, however, is an increasingly patchy safety net, which is failing to support 
some of those who need it most. The Department has made an important first step in 
committing to measure poverty differently. It must now stand ready to act on what it 
will find.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. People and organisations rarely approach select committees—or their MPs—
when everything is going well. Even allowing for that, the contrast between the 
Department’s characterisation of poverty and hardship since 2010, and the evidence 
we have heard repeatedly across multiple inquiries, from front-line organisations 
and claimants, is stark. It is difficult to avoid concluding that the Department lacks 
the tools and insight fully to understand and evaluate the impact of its reforms on 
some of the most vulnerable people it supports. (Paragraph 8)
Levels of poverty and destitution
2. How poverty is measured matters: the measurement itself defines who is “poor” 
and therefore who might be helped. Financial resources are important, but the 
Government’s existing official measures focus on one side of the profit and loss 
account: household income. They make no allowance for the inescapable costs that 
different households face: from childcare, to housing, to debt repayments, to the 
costs of having a long-term health condition. All of these costs mean that households 
with the same incomes can find themselves in very different financial positions. 
Failing to consider inescapable costs—the other side of the account—results in a 
skewed understanding of who is “in poverty”, who is vulnerable to poverty, and how 
those households should best be helped and supported. (Paragraph 18)
3. By including “inescapable costs” in its calculation, the Social Metrics Commission’s 
measure goes some way to addressing these weaknesses. We commend the 
Department for its decision to adopt and develop the Social Metrics Commission’s 
measure. (Paragraph 19)
4. Clear metrics ensure that Government is held accountable for its spending decisions. 
Yet the multiple different measures of poverty in use within and outside Government 
mean there is no such direct and effective accountability for social policy choices. 
Without a clear, agreed and central measure it is difficult to track trends in poverty 
over time, and still more so to understand how government policy helps or hinders 
poverty rates. (Paragraph 24)
5. The Department has agreed to develop and publish experimental data based on 
the Social Metrics Commission’s measure, from mid-2020. But it intends to do 
so alongside its existing poverty data—and for those data to remain the “official” 
measure of poverty. The Commission’s measure offers the prospect of an improved, 
nuanced understanding of who is in poverty, and how they can best be helped. 
Adopting it as a central measure would also protect the Department against claims 
that it picks and chooses which poverty data to use in response to different issues. 
We recommend that Government adopts the Social Metrics Commission’s metric 
as its official, central measure of poverty. It should continue to collect its existing 
poverty data alongside this, to maintain a long-term dataset. We recommend that 
Government adopts the Social Metrics Commission’s metric as its official, central 
measure of poverty. It should continue to collect its existing poverty data alongside 
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this, to maintain a long-term dataset. We also recommend the Department provides us 
with an update on the progress of its work developing the Social Metrics Commission’s 
measure by the end of 2019. (Paragraph 25)
6. The Government measures poverty in multiple different ways: its transparency 
and accountability would benefit substantially from adopting a central measure. 
Other stakeholders gather and publish data on wider, connected issues, including 
destitution, hunger, homelessness, life chances and living standards. Some of the 
most striking and concerning evidence we have received is from and about people 
who are “destitute”. But the Government does not currently measure, or even define, 
“destitution” officially. The Commission’s approach shows that it is possible to take 
the debate away from arguments about terminology, towards a more constructive 
approach to tackling major, sustained hardship. (Paragraph 28)
7. We recommend that the Department develop a measure of “destitution”. This should 
build on the Social Metrics Commission’s approach, establishing an independent 
commission to come up with a common, widely-accepted understanding of destitution 
and how it can be measured. (Paragraph 29)
8. The Social Metrics Commission believes debt repayments should be included in 
the “inescapable costs” that affect household income. We agree. Debt repayments—
including of debts to Government—can push people into a spiral of poverty, 
hardship, hunger and destitution from which it is difficult to escape. Without a good 
understanding of household debt, the prospect of well-targeted policies that help 
households alleviate and manage that debt is remote. But the data DWP collects on 
claimant debt is piecemeal, and not suitable for use with the Commission’s measure. 
We recommend the Department introduce questions on household debt to the Family 
Resources Survey for 2020/21, so that it can include debt repayments in its calculation 
of the inescapable costs that households face. (Paragraph 32)
9. The Department’s decision to reduce the maximum deduction cap in Universal 
Credit from 40% to 30% is a small step in the right direction. But if the Department 
continues to set deductions at the highest possible rate—without due consideration 
for claimants’ circumstances—it will continue to drive claimants into severe 
hardship. We have previously recommended that the Department introduce a flexible, 
discretionary approach to debt collection that takes affordability of repayments as its 
starting point, and that it takes steps to better understand the impact of deductions on 
claimant incomes and debt. We reiterate both of these recommendations, and further 
recommend the Department assess the impact of reducing the maximum deduction 
cap to 20%. (Paragraph 34)
Drivers of poverty amongst different groups
10. Pensioner poverty has fallen in the last two decades. That is thanks, in part, to 
successive governments agreeing the scale and nature of the problem, and taking 
concerted action to fix it. But the Government cannot afford to be complacent. 
Set against this success are concerns over older peoples’ financial resilience, and 
questions about whether policies that have delivered real improvements in poverty 
rates are sustainable. We intend to return to these issues in our future work. 
(Paragraph 41)
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11. Disabled people are at higher risk of falling into, and becoming trapped in, poverty 
than non-disabled people. That is, in part, because disabled people frequently face 
additional living costs. These range from basic essentials like food and fuel, to the 
costs of the adaptations and support that are needed to make society accessible. 
Disability benefits such as PIP are intended to help cover those costs and ensure that 
disabled people can participate in the economy and society on an equal footing. But 
benefit rates often fall short of the real costs of disability—and for many disabled 
people, boosting income through work can be difficult or impossible. (Paragraph 47)
12. We recommend that the Department commission an independent survey of the 
additional costs of disability and long-term health conditions. This should be 
developed alongside its new poverty measure as a means of understanding where 
benefits are falling short, and informing policy to address poverty amongst disabled 
people. (Paragraph 48)
13. The Department says that some of the most severely disabled people will receive 
more support under the current welfare system than they would have before 2010. 
But it has come at the cost of support for people with conditions that, while not 
the “most severe”, can still have a substantial impact on their day-to-day lives and 
living costs. This includes people in the ESA WRAG group and Universal Credit 
equivalent. These claimants have also been subject to freezes and reductions in the 
generosity of benefits they are entitled to—despite the Department itself finding 
them not “fit for work”. (Paragraph 49)
14. Universal Credit claimants are required to pay for childcare upfront, and claim 
the money back from DWP. Initial costs, including deposits, can run to hundreds 
of pounds: costs that may be prohibitive for people with no savings or immediate 
income. The Flexible Support Fund can be used to meet these costs, but the Secretary 
of State has admitted that she cannot be confident that the Fund is being consistently 
used for its intended purposes. The Department’s announcement that it will publish 
annual data on the Fund is very welcome, and will be helpful in understanding how 
the Fund is being used. But it will not, in itself, ensure that it is being used correctly. 
(Paragraph 57)
15. Universal Credit allows working parents to claim back up to 85% of their childcare 
costs up to a maximum cap. The Department has agreed to analyse the effect of 
the maximum caps, which have not been uprated since 2005. This is very welcome. 
It will not look, however, at the maximum reimbursement rate, which for around 
100,000 of the poorest families in the system Universal Credit replaces was almost 
100%. That means that some of the households who need support with childcare the 
most will lose out under Universal Credit. (Paragraph 58)
16. We recommend the Department extend its plans to publish data on the Flexible 
Support Fund to include research on Work Coach and claimant awareness of the 
Fund and its uses. The Department should use this opportunity to find out whether 
current guidance on the Fund is effective, how it can better publicise the Fund, and 
how it can ensure the Fund is being used to its full potential. (Paragraph 59)
17. Childcare is expensive, no matter who pays for it. But DWP could afford to increase 
support for the poorest households—and in doing so, offset an inescapable cost of 
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working—if it reduced support to the better off. We have already recommended that 
it diverts funding from Tax Free Childcare, which can be claimed by households 
earning up to £200,000, into Universal Credit. The Department says it will not do 
this, because these households “require the most support in order to return to work 
or work more”. This is absurd. (Paragraph 60)
18. We recommend the Department reconsiders its decision not to divert funding from 
wealthier families claiming Tax Free Childcare, into Universal Credit. It should 
also provide in response to this report any analysis it has carried out to inform this 
decision, particularly relating to changes to in work incentives for high earners on Tax 
Free Childcare. (Paragraph 61)
19. As millions more people transfer onto UC, it is essential that payment arrangements 
do not exacerbate financial control within a relationship. The Government needs 
to act with urgency to devise a method for splitting payments fairly within a 
couple and to proceed with it. In the meantime, we recommend that all household 
Universal Credit payments for couples with children should be to the main carer. 
The Government has said only that it will “encourage” claimants to take this option. 
That means it is unlikely to have the wholesale impact the Secretary of State intends, 
and couples where abuse or coercive control is a problem are unlikely to respond to 
“encouragement”. We recommend that, while it devises a system for splitting payments, 
the Department makes all UC payments to main carers by default. (Paragraph 63)
The benefit freeze and up-rating changes
20. The value of benefits, for people in and out of work, has been steadily eroded by 
uprating changes: the shift from RPI to CPI in 2011, and the 1% limit from 2013. 
Even without any further changes, this would have contributed to a reduction in 
financial security for many of the households that DWP supports. This includes 
people who are wholly reliant on benefits, and people who need benefits to top-up 
income from low-paid work. (Paragraph 67)
21. Most working-age benefits—including some for people who are too unwell to 
work—have been frozen since 2015/16. For three years before that, the same benefits 
were limited to a 1% increase. The Department has already saved £0.9 billion more 
than it intended via the freeze. Its regrettable decision not to lift the freeze early—
and lift 200,000 people out of poverty—means that very disadvantaged people are 
still losing out. When the freeze ends in 2020/21, a substantial chunk will have been 
taken out of the incomes of some of the country’s most vulnerable households. 
Simply lifting the freeze is not enough. (Paragraph 72)
22. The Department has invested £1.7 billion in restoring Universal Credit to its pre-
2015 generosity. This is much-needed, but it falls short of the £3.2 billion that was 
taken out of the system in 2015. Moreover, the additional spending is tilted towards 
those who are in, or able to move into, work. Investing in Universal Credit work 
allowances and tapers will offer little comfort to people whose capacity to work is 
limited (for example, by their health or by the cost and availability of childcare), and 
who rely solely or largely on benefits to meet the costs of living and keep them out 
of poverty. (Paragraph 75)
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23. The Local Housing Allowance freeze means that there is now a gap between housing 
benefit rates and rent prices in the private sector in the vast majority of English 
local authorities. These shortfalls are not trivial. In some areas, families needing 
a two-bedroom house face a shortfall of over £100 a month. Bridging a gap of this 
size would be hard enough for many people in work. For people who cannot work, 
it may be simply impossible. The Secretary of State acknowledged the problem. Her 
solution—addressing supply and demand—is necessary, but it will take time. Tenants 
need help now. They are not to blame for a mismatch between supply and demand in 
the housing market, and should not be bearing the brunt of it. (Paragraph 82)
24. Most benefits for working-age people have been frozen since 2015/16. The outcome 
is that already low benefit rates have become divorced from the real costs of living. 
People who cannot boost their incomes sufficiently through work—and who may 
find that work itself incurs additional costs (such as childcare)—face enormous, on-
going challenges in simply meeting their basic day-to-day needs. The welfare safety 
net is not fit for purpose for people living on the breadline. (Paragraph 89)
25. The Government plans to lift the benefit freeze in 2020/21. That is a necessary first 
step, but it will not be sufficient to reconnect benefit rates with the cost of living. Nor 
will it allow those who have built up debts during the freeze to begin to pay them 
off. (Paragraph 90)
26. Most benefits for working-age people have been frozen since 2015/16. The outcome 
is that already low benefit rates have become divorced from the real costs of living. 
People who cannot boost their incomes sufficiently through work—and who may 
find that work itself incurs additional costs (such as childcare)—face enormous, on-
going challenges in simply meeting their basic day-to-day needs. The welfare safety 
net is not fit for purpose for people living on the breadline. (Paragraph 88)
27. The Government plans to lift the benefit freeze in 2020/21. That is a necessary first 
step, but it will not be sufficient to reconnect benefit rates with the cost of living. Nor 
will it allow those who have built up debts during the freeze to begin to pay them 
off. (Paragraph 89)
28. We recommend that, from 2020/21, the Government should increase the rates of 
frozen benefits by CPI plus 2%. That would mean that benefit rates would, after 4 
years, reach the level at which they would have been set if they had not been frozen. 
From that point, the Department should commit to uprating benefits at least in line 
with inflation. (Paragraph 91)
29. We also recommend that the Department unfreeze Local Housing Allowance as 
planned in 2020/21, and restore rates to at least the 30th percentile of local market 
rates. Thereafter, the Department should commit to uprating Local Housing Allowance 
in line with rental prices. (Paragraph 92)
30. We remain of the view that the benefit cap should not apply to people who the 
Department does not expect to work, including single parents with small children 
and disabled people. (Paragraph 92)
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31. We remain of the view that the benefit cap should not apply to people who the 
Department does not expect to work, including single parents with small children 
and disabled people. We recommend that where the benefit cap does apply, it should 
be unfrozen and uprated in line with inflation. (Paragraph 93)
32. These measures, while necessary in the short term, will not address the fundamental 
problem: that benefit rates and caps have been set without reference to real household 
costs—the amount of money that people actually need to live on. We recommend that 
the Department produce a medium-term plan for linking the rate at which benefits 
are set with the real cost of living. It should set out how it plans to identify a method 
for doing this, and how long it expects this work to take. (Paragraph 94)
Impact and accountability
33. DWP’s decisions have a direct impact on the incomes of millions of people. Universal 
Credit (and the changes to it since impact assessments were published in 2011/12) 
may be the highest profile of these decisions, but many hundreds of thousands of 
people if not more will be coping with multiple changes to the benefits they receive. 
DWP says it does not conduct cumulative impact assessments because they do 
not look at the effect of reform on behaviour. It also says that it has a transparent 
evaluation strategy for Universal Credit. But we are not convinced that these 
arguments justify a lack of transparency or understanding of the cumulative effect 
of reforms on households’ incomes. (Paragraph 101)
34. We recommend the Department publish an updated impact assessment of Universal 
Credit, taking into account policy changes since 2011/12. It should illustrate this with 
anonymised case studies and worked examples which demonstrate the impact on 
individual claimants with a range of different circumstances. We also recommend 
that the Department commission and publish a cumulative impact assessment on the 
effect of welfare reform since 2010 on claimant incomes. This should set out clearly 
the impact on incomes of people with protected characteristics (for example, health/
disability, gender, and age). (Paragraph 102)
35. The Social Metrics Commission’s approach to measuring poverty—which the DWP 
has adopted—is underpinned by a conviction that “what gets measured gets done”. 
That also applies to the service that claimants receive from DWP. The Department 
is clear about what it expects from claimants, but vague about what claimants can 
expect from it in return. It lacks any kind of publicly available, measurable targets 
for its own performance. Unless the Department defines what is “acceptable” and 
measures whether that is being achieved, it cannot confidently claim to be delivering 
a consistently high-quality service. (Paragraph 108)
36. Without clear, measurable standards of service, claimants have little way of 
understanding whether the service they have received from DWP is acceptable. The 
Department also lacks the tools to understand whether it is consistently delivering 
a good service—because it has not defined what “good” is. We, the National Audit 
Office, and the Social Security Advisory Committee have all repeatedly asked the 
Department to do this. The Department, reasonably, wants to maintain flexibility in 
 Welfare safety net 66
the service it delivers to claimants. But that applies equally to other public services 
such as health and education, where standards are independently monitored and 
measured. DWP, and Jobcentre Plus, is not a special case. (Paragraph 115)
37. We recommend the Department work with its stakeholders including claimants 
and delivery partners, including Citizens Advice, to establish suitable performance 
measures for its working-age benefit delivery and to implement these. The measures 
should be published and accompanied by clear targets, and monitored initially by an 
internal review body and external advisory board. We recommend that alongside 
this the Department scopes whether there is a case for establishing an independent 
regulator for working age benefits and services. It should set out an interim assessment 
in response to this report. (Paragraph 116)
Conclusion
38. The welfare safety net is about more than income, and more than DWP’s policies. 
But the DWP has a vital role to play in maintaining its integrity, simply because 
its decisions affect the incomes of so many households. Successive Governments 
have made huge savings from almost a decade of changes to uprating policies and 
freezes. The corollary, however, is an increasingly patchy safety net, which is failing 
to support some of those who need it most. The Department has made an important 
first step in committing to measure poverty differently. It must now stand ready to 
act on what it will find. (Paragraph 117)
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Formal minutes
Wednesday 17 July 2019
Members present:
Rt Hon Frank Field, in the Chair
Heidi Allen Nigel Mills
Ruth George Chris Stephens
Steve McCabe
Draft report (Welfare safety net), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 117 read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Twenty-eighth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 24 July at 9.45am
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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
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Wednesday 16 January 2019
The Baroness Phillipa Stroud, Chair, Social Metrics Commission, Matthew 
Oakley, Secretariat of the Social Metrics Commission Q1–52
Professor Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Director, Institute for Social Policy, Housing 
and Equalities Research, Heriot-Watt University, Julie Jarman, Principal, 
Living Standards Programme, Equality and Human Rights Commission Q53–107
Wednesday 13 February 2019
Peter Tutton, Head of Policy, StepChange Debt Charity, Sumi 
Rabindrakumar, Head of Policy and Research, The Trussell Trust, Deborah 
Garvie, Policy Manager, Shelter Q108–136
Sheila McKandie, Benefits and Welfare Manager, Highland Council, 
Veronica Dunn, Cabinet member for Resources, Newcastle City Council Q137–156
Michael Griffin, Senior Policy and Campaign Adviser, Parkinson’s UK, Sally 
West, Policy Manager, Income and Poverty, Age UK, Elliot Kent, Member, 
National Association of Welfare Rights Advisers, Fran Bennett, Member, 
Policy Advisory Group, UK Women’s Budget Group Q157–183
Wednesday 27 March 2019
Justin Tomlinson MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department 
for Work and Pensions, Neil Couling, Director General, Universal 
Credit Programme, Donna Ward, Policy Director, Children, Families and 
Disadvantage Q184–284
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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
WSN numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 A Menu for Change (WSN0091)
2 Adrian Venditti (WSN0008)
3 Advice NI (WSN0007)
4 Advice Nottingham (WSN0069)
5 Association of Pensions & Benefits Claimants CIC (WSN0027)
6 Banburyshire Advice Centre (WSN0013)
7 Bangor University (WSN0004)
8 Bright Blue (WSN0126)
9 British Red Cross (WSN0123)
10 Cathedral Food Bank, Bangor (WSN0040)
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13 Changing Lives (WSN0043)
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15 Child Poverty Action Group (WSN0116)
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21 Citizen’s Basic Income Trust (WSN0037)
22 Community Links (WSN0076)
23 Crisis (WSN0099)
24 Daylight Centre Fellowship (WSN0014)
25 Dean Hawkins (WSN0022)
26 Department for Work and Pensions (WSN0108)
27 Depaul UK (WSN0089)
28 Derby County Council (WSN0119)
29 Disability Rights UK (WSN0083)
30 End Hunger UK (WSN0088)
31 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0111)
32 Equality and Human Rights Commission (WSN0124)
33 Homeless Link (WSN0067)
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41 Liverpool City Council (WSN0100)
42 Lloyds Bank Foundation for England and Wales (WSN0101)
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45 London School of Economics (WSN0109)
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73 Nottingham Trent University (WSN0102)
74 Nottingham Trent University (WSN0125)
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